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Subtyping Psychopathy: Exploring the Roles of Degree of Punishment,  
Cognitive Dissonance and Optimism 
 
John M. Weir 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
For over half of a century, social and behavioral scientists have been investigating 
the construct of psychopathy.  Even so, psychopathy is still a highly misunderstood 
personality construct.  Even though it has been estimated that psychopaths make up only 
about 1% of the general population, they are believed to consist of 15-25% of the prison 
population (Hare, 1996).  However, not all psychopaths are in prison.  Psychopaths can 
also be found in such fields as the legal profession, the business world and in politics 
(Babiak, 1995).  In terms of criminal behaviors, psychopaths are arrested at earlier ages, 
have a higher rate of offending, commit a wider array of offenses, are more likely to have 
used weapons and threatened violence, and are more likely to have used violence (Hart 
and Hare, 1997; Hare and McPherson, 1984; Serin, 1991; Wong, 1985).  Also, once 
released from an institution, rates of recidivism for psychopaths are found to be higher 
than those for other criminals regarding both violent and non-violent criminal acts 
(Hemphill, Hare & Wong, 1998).  Therefore, the societal importance of the psychopathy 
construct demanded that more research be conducted to better understand its underlying 
etiology, potential variants in typology, clinical course and potential treatment.     
 Prior theories have proposed subtypes of psychopathy based on cognitive 
variables (passive avoidance errors) and on physiological variables (BIS/BAS) and on  
 
vi 
 environmental variables (supportive upbringing or not).  This study utilized self-report  
measures to assess the presence of psychopathy and to test the validity of the cognitive 
and physiological explanations for subtypes of psychopathy.  A cognitive dissonance task 
tested the validity of the physiological theory and an alteration of a punishment task 
which increases the degree and strength of punishment tested the cognitive theory.  
Further, for the first time the construct of optimism was tested to determine it’s role in 
parsing out two types of psychopathy.    
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Introduction 
For over half of a century, a small yet ever increasing group of social and 
behavioral scientists have been investigating the construct of psychopathy.  Even so, of 
all the psychiatric determinants of criminal behavior, psychopathy is still likely the least 
understood and agreed upon condition.  Cleckley, in his 1941 book entitled The Mask of 
Sanity, may have had the greatest early influence on the study of this construct.  In the 
original 1941 version, Cleckley detailed 19 criteria (e.g., lack of remorse, superficial 
charm) that defined the "primary" psychopathic personality.  He later condensed these 19 
criteria to 16 by the time he wrote the 4th edition (Cleckley, 1976).  These criteria have 
subsequently directed much of the research on psychopathy and have served as the basis 
for diagnostic measures of the construct, such as Hare's Psychopathy Checklist (PCL; 
PCL-R)(Hare, 1991; Lykken, 1995).1 
 Undoubtedly, what interests many researchers about psychopaths is the negative 
impact that such individuals often have on the rest of society, combined with a lack of 
remorse that they often display about these effects.  Such individuals have long invoked 
both morbid curiosity and great concern at the same time.  Regarding the negative impact 
on others, the behaviors of psychopaths has led some to characterize them as intra-
                                            
1 Much of the psychopathy research focuses on studies using the PCL-R with offender samples. 
By convention investigators have applied the term “psychopath” to individuals whose score on 
the PCL-R exceeded some minimum level (commonly, but not consistently, 29). However, 
psychopathy is not a recognized diagnosis in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual, and recent research on psychopathy indicates that it is a dimensional 
rather than categorical construct (Edens, Marcus, Lilienfeld & Poythress, 2006; Marcus, John & 
Edens, 2004). Thus, categorical language in this dissertation regarding “psychopaths” is 
conventional and intended to connote individuals who attained, or are likely to attain, high scores 
on whatever psychopathy measure is being discussed.    
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species predators (Hare 1996).  Even though it has been estimated that they make up only 
about 1% of the general population, psychopaths are believed to make up 15-25% of the 
prison population (Hare, 1996).  However, not all psychopaths are violent criminals who 
end up in prison.  For example, the individuals that Cleckley based his observations on 
were all non-prisoners coming from sources such as psychiatric hospitals and the 
community (Cleckley, 1976).  Psychopaths can be found in such fields as the legal 
profession, the business world and in politics (Babiak, 1995).  Such non-criminal 
psychopaths often use times of upheaval to violate social norms, gain power over others 
and cold-bloodedly use others for their own benefit. 
 In terms of criminal behaviors, psychopaths are arrested at earlier ages, have a 
higher rate of offending, commit a wider array of offenses, are more likely to have used 
weapons and threatened violence, and are more likely to have used violence (Hart and 
Hare, 1997; Hare and McPherson, 1984; Serin, 1991).  Continual problems with these 
individuals even after they are caught is not surprising since the disorder is considered to 
be stable and lifelong in its presentation (Harpur and Hare, 1994).  Therefore, it should 
not be surprising that psychopathy has been found to be predictive of recidivism after 
release from prison and of behavioral problems for currently institutionalized individuals.  
 Regarding institutional misbehavior, researchers have found that institutionalized 
psychopaths behave inappropriately (both violently and non-violently) at rates higher 
than non-psychopathic institutionalized individuals (Hare, 1996).  For example, 
correlations between PCL-R scores and general institutional misbehavior have been 
found to be quite high (r = .80) in those psychopaths who were serving sentences of at 
least 7 months in length (Cooke, 1995).  Two recent meta-analyses (Guy, Edens, 
Anthony & Douglas (2005); Walters (2003)) indicate that of the two PCL-R factors of 
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psychopathy (factor 1 capturing the interpersonal and affective aspects of the construct 
and factor 2 capturing the antisocial and socially deviant lifestyle aspects of the 
construct), it is factor 2 of the PCL-R that has been found to be most highly associated 
with institutional misconduct.  Also, Guy et al. (2005) found that it was the non-violent 
modes of misconduct that showed the largest effect sizes regardless of whether the PCL-
R total score, factor 1 or 2 was examined.  Further, regardless of which part of the PCL-R 
was used, Guy et al. (2005) found that the smallest effect sizes were found for the 
physically violent modes of misconduct.  Lastly, psychopaths are often found to be 
released later into their sentences and under closer supervision than non-psychopathic 
offenders (Serin, Peters & Barbaree, 1990). 
 Once released from an institution, rates of recidivism for psychopaths are found to 
be higher than those for other criminals regarding both violent and non-violent criminal 
acts (Hemphill, Hare & Wong, 1998).  Furthermore, released psychopaths have been 
shown to violate the conditions of their release more frequently and pose more frequent 
supervision problems while on release than do non-psychopaths (Hart, Kropp & Hare, 
1988).  In fact, as predicted by PCL-R scores, rates of violent recidivism by psychopaths 
were found to be three to five times higher than that of non-psychopaths over a one-year 
period directly after release from an institution (Hemphill, Hare & Wong, 1998).  Most 
important, the PCL-R has been found to predict recidivism better than other more widely 
used predictor variables such as past criminal behavior, demographic variables or other 
diagnoses related to criminal conduct such as Anti-Social Personality Disorder (ASPD) 
(Hart, Kropp & Hare, 1988; Hemphill, Hare & Wong, 1998).   
 Despite the large and growing body of evidence of the utility of the construct of 
psychopathy, it has yet to become officially recognized as a psychiatric disorder.  For 
  4
some time, psychopathy researchers have been lobbying to have psychopathy included in 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) as a clinical diagnosis.  
Their position has been that the diagnosis of ASPD (the official psychiatric diagnosis 
with the strongest relations to criminality) is too broad and is, to a great extent, simply a 
diagnosis based on the number of previous criminal behaviors.  Therefore, ASPD as a 
diagnosis would appear to be over inclusive and is being given to many people who may 
at worst have only mild forms of a lesser psychiatric disorder, but who are being 
diagnosed with ASPD because they are criminals who simply commit enough antisocial 
or illegal acts to receive the diagnosis.  In fact, the estimates of the percentage of 
prisoners who fulfill the criteria for the ASPD diagnosis range from 50% to 80% 
depending on sources (Hare, 1996; Hare, Forth & Strachan, 1992).  On the other hand, as 
mentioned previously, psychopathy has long been defined in terms of personality 
characteristics that do not necessarily have anything to do with criminal behavior.  As far 
back as Cleckley, the most fundamental features of psychopathy are actually believed to 
be affective and interpersonal characteristics rather than criminal behaviors per se 
(Patrick, 2006).  Furthermore, the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), the best 
validated measure for assessing psychopathy in offenders, has been factor analyzed and 
found to be underpinned by two correlated factors.  Criminal behavior indicators 
contribute to only one of these two factors, the other comprising mainly interpersonal and 
affective features.  Because a diagnosis of psychopathy is less behavior-based than is 
ASPD, only about 15-25% of prisoners meet PCL-R criteria for a diagnosis of 
psychopathy (Hare, 1996).  However, as mentioned earlier, it is the psychopathic 
offenders who commit more criminal acts in the community and are more problematic in 
correctional and forensic institutions. 
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 Clearly, the societal importance of the psychopathy construct demands that more 
research be conducted to better understand its underlying etiology, potential variants in 
typology, clinical course and potential treatment.  This dissertation study will investigate 
aspects of psychopathy theory that detail potential underlying mechanisms for the 
distinction between previously proposed subtypes of psychopathy.  It is hoped that 
through a clearer understanding of the etiology of the construct, it will be more likely that 
psychopathy will be fully integrated into the DSM as a clinical diagnosis and that future 
methods of treatment will also be possible. 
Theories of the Construct of Psychopathy 
 Cleckley’s theory.  Cleckley's apparent motivation in writing the original 1941 
edition of The Mask of Sanity was simply to detail the characteristics of the syndrome 
and in the 1976 edition he suggested that once the construct was better defined, it could 
be "further differentiated" (p. 229).  Since Cleckley's initial 1941 work, investigators in 
the psychopathy field have come to call a psychopath characterized by his criteria as the 
"primary psychopath".    
 Karpman’s theory.  Cleckley's contemporary, Benjamin Karpman, also 
contributed to early theoretical considerations about the existence of subtypes of 
psychopathy.  Karpman's work (1941; 1948) moved the field strongly towards examining 
psychopathy as a construct with two distinct subtypes labeled "primary" and "secondary".  
While acknowledging that on the surface, the behaviors of both types of psychopath 
appeared similar, Karpman (1941; 1948) made intriguing distinctions between the 
"primary" and "secondary" psychopaths in their etiology.  He considered "primary" 
psychopaths to have a constitutional (biological) deficit that rendered them unlikely to be 
responsive to any treatment.  He considered the behavior of "secondary" psychopaths to 
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be a product of their environment, without any underlying biological deficits, and that, 
unlike the primary psychopath, "secondary" psychopaths may benefit from treatment 
(Karpman, 1941; 1948).   
 Fowles’/Gray’s BIS/BAS theory.  Fowles (1980) developed a coherent theoretical 
framework pertaining to the "primary" type of psychopath as an individual who has a 
biological etiology to his/her psychopathy.  Fowles utilized Gray's (1975) two factor 
learning theory that proposes the existence of three arousal systems within the autonomic 
nervous system which, when activated, are believed to trigger specific types of 
behavioral responses (Fowles, 1980).  One of these systems is the behavioral activation 
system (BAS).  Activation of the BAS results in appetitive, approach oriented, reward-
seeking behavior.  The BAS becomes activated in response to conditioned stimuli for 
rewards (Fowles, 1980).  The second system of note here is the behavioral inhibition 
system (BIS).  Activation of the BIS results in inhibition of behavior, which has been 
conditioned to signal either response contingent punishment or frustrative non-reward 
(Fowles, 1980).  In terms of research evidence for his position, Fowles (1980) presented 
a number of experimental outcomes that support his position that a weak BIS is the basis 
for psychopaths' behavior.  This evidence includes studies which showed that 
psychopath's had worse classical conditioning to aversive unconditioned stimuli than did 
non-psychopaths, psychopaths showed smaller increases in skin conductance levels when 
awaiting aversive stimuli, and psychopaths showed no reduction in HR in anticipation of 
shock or aversive stimuli (Hare, 1978).  In fact psychopaths' HR accelerated in 
anticipation of aversive stimuli and that pointed to a potentially stronger BAS as well as a 
weaker BIS in psychopaths.  The results also showed that psychopaths were deficient in 
electrodermal activities that were believed to be mediated by the BIS system alone.  
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Based on his theorizing and this research data relating to the BIS and BAS systems, 
Fowles (1980) proposed that a weak or deficient BIS system was at the root of the 
clinical characteristics (low anxiety, low negative affect, inability to inhibit behavior 
when faced with threats of punishment or non-reward) of the “primary” type of 
psychopath. 
 Lykken’s theory.  Lykken (1995) has also argued that differential BIS and BAS 
functioning could help to distinguish the etiologies of secondary and primary 
psychopaths.  Originally Lykken (1957) proposed that primary psychopaths had a 
deficient ability to experience fear, and that this led to an inability to learn from 
punishment, which in turn, led to their antisocial behaviors.  As Lykken described in his 
1995 book, he conducted the first experiment to support the low-fear hypothesis in 1954.  
He utilized subjects who fit all 16 of Cleckley's criteria for a psychopath (group 1), had 
antisocial behavior but did not fit all 16 criteria (group 2) and 15 normal subjects 
(matched for age, gender and education with the two psychopath groups) (group 3).  
Lykken found that the group 1 individuals showed less fearfulness as measured by self-
reported subjective ratings of the level of fearfulness of situations that they read about.  
Lykken also found that those in group 1 showed lower electro-dermal responses to 
conditioned punishing stimuli than other groups.  Lastly, Lykken showed that 
participants from group 1 showed more passive avoidance learning errors when they 
more often made a mistake in choosing a punishing response while learning a task.  
Lykken (1995) has stated that his low-fear hypothesis has not only been supported 
experimentally by himself, but has also been repeatedly replicated by others as well.   
 Once Fowles proposed his theory, Lykken saw the inherent similarities in their 
proposals and melded them together into what he called the Fowles-Gray-Lykken theory 
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(Lykken ,1995).  The Fowles-Gray-Lykken theory proposes that primary psychopathy is 
a consequence of an inherently fearless temperament that is reflected in a weak BIS 
system and which may lead to poor socialization.  Lykken (1995) also stated that: "it 
seems to me, in fact, that the Fowles-Gray-Lykken theory provides the firmest available 
foundation on which to build the future experimental study of psychopathic personality.  
It assimilates the Lykken low-fear theory, now the "weak BIS" theory; it suggests 
a....secondary psychopath(y), the "strong BAS" individual...." (p. 163).  As further 
support, in a 2005 article, Newman et al., investigated the usefulness of the BIS/BAS 
constructs in the distinction between types of psychopaths.  In the 2005 article, Newman 
and colleagues utilized Carver and White's (1994) BIS/BAS scales to determine if low 
anxious psychopaths (primary) and high anxious psychopaths (secondary) differed on 
self-reported trait manifestations of these hypothetical physiological constructs.  The 
results of this study suggested that primary psychopaths were indeed characterized by a 
weak BIS and normal BAS as previously hypothesized by the Fowles-Gray-Lykken 
theory (See figure 1 for a theoretical construction of how primary, secondary and non-
psychopaths should score on various indices according to the theories covered to this 
point). 
 Status of the construct, taxon or dimensional?  As appears to be the case 
regarding many psychiatric diagnoses already included in the DSM, even with the 
longstanding history of research on psychopathy, there has still been a good deal of 
disagreement regarding whether psychopathy should be considered a taxon or 
dimensional construct.  A clear example of the taxonic viewpoint to psychopathy, is the 
use of cut off scores (which are indicative of a categorical construct) in scoring the gold 
standard measure of the construct (Hare's PCL, and later revision, the PCL-R).   
  9
 An early attempt to determine if psychopathy is dimensional or categorical was 
conducted by Harris, Rice, and Quinsey (1994).  These authors analyzed data acquired 
through administering the PCL-R to a group of mentally ill offenders residing in a 
psychiatric facility.  They concluded from these analyses that psychopathy is a taxonic 
construct.  They also went as far as to propose what the appropriate cut off scores should 
be for the use of the PCL-R in identifying psychopaths (Harris, Rice, and Quinsey, 1994).  
The results of this study have strongly influenced many researcher's perceptions of the 
construct.    
 However, those who felt that the construct was more likely dimensional in nature 
have recently published findings based on new statistical techniques which rather 
strongly refute the prior findings from Harris, Rice, and Quinsey (1994).  First, Marcus, 
John and Edens (2004) used three independent taxometric procedures to investigate the 
structure of the construct and their results showed that psychopathy has a dimensional 
structure when the construct is measured with the Psychopathic Personality Inventory 
(Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996).  Further, Edens, Markus, Lilienfeld and Poythress (2006) 
followed up on Markus et al. (2004), by using four independent taxometric procedures to 
investigate the same question while using the PCL-R as the measure of psychopathy.  
Their results indicating that psychopathy is best considered a dimensional construct were 
consistent with the earlier findings by Markus et al. (2004).   
Measures of Psychopathy  
 Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist (PCL).  In terms of the assessment of psychopathy, 
Robert Hare (1980) developed the semi-structured interview called the Psychopathy 
Checklist (PCL) and its later revision (PCL-R) (Hare, 1991, 2003).  In conducting an 
assessment of psychopathy, data from the semi-structured interview are combined with 
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collateral information gathered from any available file reviews (such as department of 
corrections records) are combined to make ratings of the degree to which any individual's 
exhibited traits and behaviors match prototypes of 20 separate features.  Hare (1996) has 
written that "the total score for the PCL-R provides an estimate of the extent to which a 
given individual matches the prototypical psychopath, as exemplified, in the 1976 work 
of Cleckley" (p. 30).  Factor analyses of the PCL and the PCL-R have shown that the 
measures are composed of two factors.  Factor 1 comprises items that incorporate the 
affective and interpersonal features of psychopathy such as shallow affect, lack of 
remorse and manipulative behavior, whereas factor 2 comprises items that incorporate 
the features associated with impulsivity, social deviance and anti-social behaviors (Hare, 
1996). 
 Although the PCL-R's two factors have been shown to be correlated at 
approximately (r = .5), they also show differential correlations with many external 
variables (Hare, 1996). For example, Factor 1 is significantly negatively correlated with 
anxiety (Hare, 1991; Hare, 1996, Patrick, 1994), neuroticism (Brinkley et al., 2004; Hare, 
1991), negative emotional responses (stress reactions) (Hicks et al., 2004; Hicks & 
Patrick, 2006; Patrick, 1994), fear/distress responses (Buss and Plomin, 1984; Hicks & 
Patrick, 2006), and negative affectivity (Patrick, 1994).  Conversely, factor 2 shows a 
significant positive correlation with anxiety (Hare, 1991; Hare, 1996, Patrick, 1994), 
neuroticism (Brinkley et al., 2004; Hare, 1991), negative emotional responses (stress 
reactions) (Hicks et al., 2004; Hicks & Patrick, 2006; Patrick, 1994), fear/distress 
responses (Buss and Plomin, 1984; Hicks & Patrick, 2006) and negative affectivity 
(Patrick, 1994).  These two factors are also differentially correlated with planning (in 
regards to aggressive behavior), such that factor 1 is positively correlated and factor 2 is 
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negatively correlated with this construct (Hart and Dempster, 1997).  Regarding variables 
preferentially associated with only one of the two factors, factor 1 has been found to be 
highly related to personality constructs such as narcissism and histrionic personality 
disorder, whereas factor 2 has shown to be preferentially associated with a diagnosis of 
ASPD, suicidality and substance abuse (Hare, 1996; Hare, Forth & Strahan, 1992; 
Reardon, Lang & Patrick, 2002; Verona, Patrick & Joiner, 2001).  These differential 
relations between PCL-R factors and criterion variables appear to be most reliably 
demonstrated when partial correlations are used (Benning et al., 2003).  Specifically, for 
those variables that tap into the negative emotionality construct, this may be due to 
suppressor effects which can effect the strength of a relationship of two correlated 
predictors (such as factor 1 and 2 from the PCL-R) when their relationship to a third 
criterion variable is assessed (Hicks & Patrick, 2006). 
 Lilienfeld’s Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI).  Recently a number of 
self-report measures of psychopathy have also been developed.  One of these is 
Lilienfeld's Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996).  As 
mentioned, this measure employs a self-report format in contrast to the lengthy semi-
structured interview with file review required for the PCL-R.  The PPI also has shown a 
clear two-factor structure (Benning et al., 2003), although the PPI factors are 
uncorrelated with each other.  These two PPI factors have shown substantial similarity in 
their external correlations to those of the two factors of the more resource intensive PCL-
R.  As with PCL-R factor 1, PPI Factor I is negatively correlated with trait anxiety, stress 
reactions, negative emotionality, while having negligible relation to with drug and abuse 
as well as anti-social behavior (Benning et al., 2003; Patrick et al., 2006).  Similar to 
PCL-R factor 2, PPI factor II is positively related to drug and alcohol abuse, poor 
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planning, aggressiveness, anti-social behavior, negative emotionality and anxiety 
(Benning et al., 2003; Patrick et al., 2006).  One study which was conducted before the 
two factor structure of the PPI was discovered showed that convergent validity between 
the PPI total score and PCL-R was .54 for factor 1, .40 for factor 2 and .54 with the PCL-
R total score (Poythress et al., 1998).  However, it was also found in the Poythress et al. 
study that most of the unique variance of the PPI scores was associated with the PCL-R 
factor 1 scale.  This would seem to indicate that the PPI may tap more into the core 
affective-interpersonal factors of psychopathy which is what PCL-R factor 1 is believed 
to measure. 
 Levenson’s Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRPS).  Levenson and colleagues also 
created a self-report measure of psychopathy that is called the Self-Report Psychopathy 
Scale (SRPS; Levenson, Kiehl & Fitzpatrick, 1995).  Like Lilienfeld's measure, the SRPS 
was designed to be used with non-offender populations.  Some of the main benefits of 
this scale are its brevity (it consists of only 26 questions) and the fact that when factor 
analyzed, it can be parsed into 2 scales that are purported to be similar to factor’s 1 and 2 
from Hare's PCL-R measure.  The primary scale of the SRPS consists of 16 questions 
that are analogous to Hare's factor 1 of the PCL-R.  The secondary scale of the SRPS 
consists of 10 items and is analogous to Hare's factor 2 of the PCL-R.  Lynam, Whiteside 
and Jones (1999) conducted a validation study of the SRPS and concluded that there was 
good evidence for the validity of this measure in a college student sample.  They also 
determined that over an 8-week period, the test-retest reliability of the SRPS was quite 
high (r = .83).  Brinkley et al. (2001), also validated this measure (this time against the 
PCL-R) in a prison sample and reported that the SRPS showed good internal consistency 
and was significantly correlated with the total score and factor scores of the PCL-R.  
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However, the magnitude of the correlations were small to modest, suggesting that the 
SRPS measures a somewhat different construct than the PCL-R.  Although originally 
developed for use with non-offender populations, this scale is currently being studied in 
groups institutionalized in a correctional setting to determine its validity and reliability 
with such populations. 
Research on Subtyping Psychopathy  
 Newman’s response modulation deficit.  Even with the evident abundance of 
work on the construct, presently there is still no single theory to explain the different 
etiologies of subtypes of psychopaths that receives unequivocal support.  In the last 
decade however, it has been the physiological theories that have appeared to have 
received the lion's share of the attention from researchers.  Perhaps it was only a matter 
of time before researchers more closely focused on physiology for answers as to what 
makes psychopaths tick.  One specific line of psychopathy research that, in part, falls 
under the physiological umbrella (depending on what level of analysis one prefers to 
focus on) has been conducted by Joseph Newman and his colleagues.  Since the 1980's, 
Newman and colleagues have been examining the difficulty that psychopaths were 
theorized to exhibit in passively avoiding punishment or non-reward to learned 
conditioned stimuli (Arnet, Howland, Smith, & Newman, 1993; Newman & Kosson, 
1986; Newman, Widom & Nathan, 1985; Patterson, Kosson & Newman, 1987; Newman 
et al., 1990).  In their experiments, Newman and colleagues have compared the 
performance of both high anxious psychopaths (secondary psychopaths) and low anxious 
psychopaths (primary psychopaths) with that of non-psychopaths on tasks that could be 
used to assess the ability to engage in passive avoidance.   
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While not originally stated as such by Newman and colleagues, their line of 
inquiry appears to fit well with the work of Fowles (1980), who theorized that those low 
in BIS are likely to exhibit difficulty passively avoiding a stimulus after being operantly 
conditioned to respond.  Further, Fowles (1988) cited studies by Newman and colleagues 
(Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman, Widom & Nathan, 1985) as evidence for the role 
of the BIS system in poor passive avoidance learning.  Utilizing a learning theory 
approach Newman and colleagues have shown in a number of studies that psychopaths 
with low levels of anxiety (similar to what many would consider a primary psychopath) 
do have a more difficult time than do non-psychopaths in discontinuing their responding 
to a stimulus once it is no longer advantageous for them to continue responding (Arnet, 
Howland, Smith, & Newman, 1993; Newman, Patterson & Kosson, 1987; Newman, 
Widom & Nathan, 1985; Newman et al., 1990).   
 Based on his previous work, Newman has proposed a cognitive theory to explain 
why the low anxious psychopaths are poor at passively avoiding the punishments in his 
paradigm.  In this theory (called the response modulation hypothesis), psychopaths 
become too narrowly focused on the behavior which has been conditioned as rewarding 
and do not notice the change in payoffs as they proceed through the experimental 
protocol, during which time, the originally rewarded behavior becomes punished instead 
(Newman, Patterson & Kosson, 1987).  More recently, Newman (1997) conducted 
research directed at determining the relation between behavioral inhibition and the 
differing types of psychopathy.  While in this article he did not find a relation between 
psychopathy and his measure of BIS, he did acknowledge the likelihood that a 
psychobiological process may be at the heart of the passive avoidance learning deficit 
that he and his group have been investigating for over a decade.  However, there have 
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also been studies that have not been supportive of the deficiencies that psychopaths are 
thought to exhibit in passive avoidance tasks.  First, Schmauk (1970) did not find that 
low anxious (primary) psychopaths differed from controls on measures of skin 
conductance when they took part in a passive avoidance task involving the potential loss 
of money as part of the task.  Second, Howard, Payamal & Neo (1997), attempted to 
replicate earlier work by Newman and his colleagues and did not find that psychopaths 
differed from non-psychopaths on passive avoidance tasks. 
 Even though some of the above studies only infer physiological processes while 
others directly measure it, it still stands that they suggest that the physiological 
underpinnings of psychopathy are not yet fully understood.  Yet this is understandable 
when considering the many different social behaviors and physiological responses that 
have been studied both within and across laboratories.  Also, following from Cacioppo 
and Bernston's (1992) doctrine of multilevel analysis, it should be clear that while macro 
level (social) behaviors are most completely understood only when their micro level 
(biological) antecedents are examined, for any macro level behavior there could be 
multiple micro level antecedents and conversely any micro level antecedent may produce 
many differing macro level behaviors depending on macro level conditions. A classic 
example given by Cacioppo and Bernston (1992) describes a researcher observing the 
behavior of a group of chimpanzees.  The researcher is confused about why they were not 
mating as anticipated.  After taking blood samples, it is found that there is nothing wrong 
with them hormonally yet they do not mate.  Only later is it discovered that the makeup 
of their social order in their cages was incorrect.  Once this social (macro level) problem 
was understood and corrected, the chimpanzees soon began to mate as was expected.  If 
researchers had only relied on the hormonal (micro level) information, they never would 
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have understood what was wrong and why the chimpanzees were not mating.  But 
through an investigation at multiple levels of analysis, researchers were able to more 
fully understand the situation.   
 This complexity involved in best understanding any construct and its operating 
mechanisms (or etiology) could easily explain why the results from some studies are not 
universally supportive of the physiological position (Howard, Payamal & Neo, 1997; 
Newman, 1997; Schmauk, 1970).  However, this lack of consistent support for the 
physiological (BIS/BAS arousal) position simply supports the case for more research to 
be conducted on the various macro level conditions that may elicit different behaviors 
from the two subtypes of psychopaths (different both from each other as well as from 
non-psychopaths as well).   
 Newman’s procedure for assessing passive avoidance deficits.  At this point it is 
appropriate to describe in some detail the task that Newman and colleagues have used to 
assess passive avoidance learning.  While some minor aspects of the task can vary, the 
basic conditions are that participants are presented with stimuli and when they respond 
incorrectly (i.e., they make a response, rather than withholding a response) they commit a 
passive avoidance error.  The basic design of the task consists of numbers being 
presented sequentially on a computer screen and participants must learn on their own to 
distinguish the stimuli (which numbers on a screen) that are rewarded (e.g., earning a 
dime) for responding (pressing a button) from those that are punished (e.g., losing a 
dime) for responding (pressing a button).  Conceptually it is expected that, after being 
presented with an initial practice block of stimuli that contains a high proportion of 
rewarding stimuli, participants should become conditioned to actively respond to stimuli 
which are presented on the screen.  Once active responding has been established as a 
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dominant response set, then the reward schedule changes.  Over the course of numerous 
blocks of trials, rewarding and punishing stimuli are presented equally as often within 
each block.  In fact, if a participant responded to every stimulus that is presented they 
would be rewarded half of the time and punished half of the time.  The only difference 
within each block is the order in which rewarding and punishing stimuli are presented.  
Further, when participants respond to the various task stimuli, they are either monetarily 
rewarded (for correct responses) or punished (for incorrect responses, otherwise known 
as passive avoidance errors).  It is at this point that participants must exhibit their ability 
to passively (on their own through experience) learn to avoid making errors.  If the 
participant can withhold responding to non-rewarding stimuli at this point, then he/she 
has learned to passively avoid committing errors.  If the participant does not withhold 
responses to non-rewarding stimuli, then that person has not learned to passively avoid 
committing errors.    
 While Newman and colleagues have accumulated evidence for the presence of 
this passive avoidance deficit, they have still utilized a rather narrow range of macro 
level stimuli (this being a stimulus at a more observable, social level) to produce the 
effect.  In essence, they have only determined that their primary type of psychopath 
shows passive avoidance decrements when rewards and punishments are given out 
equally in an experiment.  This leaves open the question of whether passive avoidance is 
a broad macro level problem or not.  What is lacking and has not been attempted as of yet 
is to dramatically change the reward/punishment pattern for psychopaths within an 
experiment to see if an abrupt change in the payoffs will lead to improved passive 
avoidance learning.   
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 As a point of departure, let us again examine the rate of reward and punishment in 
previous experiments.  As mentioned above, the rate of payoffs in Newman's passive 
avoidance task has been intermittent in nature, with half of the stimuli in each block 
being rewarding and half punishing, but the order of these outcomes is variable.  What 
has not been examined is the response of psychopathic individuals to an experimental 
situation in which they are faced with a sudden, large increase in the frequency of non-
rewarded stimuli.  Also, none of the Newman experiments increased the severity of the 
punishment during the protocol.  The results from decades of research on the effects of 
rewards and punishments on animals and humans has clearly shown that increasing either 
the intensity or frequency of a punishment will decrease a target behavior and that 
increasing both is the strongest method of all to decrease an unwanted target behavior 
(Appel, 1968; Bradshaw, Szabadi & Bevan, 1979; Critchfield, et al., 2003; Johnston, 
1972; Lande, 1981; Moffitt, 1983; Sizemore & Maxwell, 1985).  Therefore, as a first 
purpose for this dissertation, I propose to extend the work by Newman and colleagues by 
utilizing a protocol that while similar to their previous designs, will differ substantially in 
the intensity and frequency of punishments experienced by participants and thereby 
extend the field's knowledge about the macro level conditions under which the different 
subtypes of psychopaths (as compared to each other and to non-psychopaths) exhibit 
passive avoidance deficits.   
 Physiological responses to emotionally provoking stimuli.  A second and more 
physiologically based course of investigation in the psychopathy literature involves the 
deficit or even complete absence of normal responses that psychopaths are believed to 
exhibit in response to various emotion-provoking stimuli (Cleckley, 1976; Day and 
Wong, 1996; Patrick, Bradley, & Lang, 1993; Patrick, 2001; Williamson, Hare, & Wong, 
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1987).  Whereas some investigators suggest that this condition accounts for poor passive 
avoidance learning (due to a lack of the production of a fear or anxiety response which 
should inhibit responding), this condition could potentially lead to other behaviors in the 
psychopath as well.  First, what is the supporting research evidence that psychopaths in 
general, and any subtype specifically may lack normal emotional responses to stimuli?  
While the support for this position is not unanimous, a number of researchers have 
provided evidence that in a number of contexts, psychopaths show a decrement in their 
responses to words, pictures or vignettes that elicit emotional reactions from normal 
individuals (Christiansen et al., 1996; Kiehl, Hare, McDonald & Brink, 1999; Patrick, 
1994; Steuerwald & Kosson, 2000; Williamson, Harpur & Hare, 1991).  Furthermore, it 
has been shown in a number of studies that decrements in emotional responding are 
associated preferentially with features associated with primary psychopathy (e.g., PCL-R 
Factor 1) (Lorenz and Newman, 2002; Patrick, Bradley & Lang, 1993; Patrick, 1994).   
Proposed New Directions in Subtyping Psychopathy 
 Cognitive dissonance.  An experimental model that could capitalize on the 
deficits in affective responding described above would provide a valuable vehicle for 
investigating the differentiation of psychopathic subtypes.  Just such a paradigm is 
outlined in the theory of cognitive dissonance.  Festinger originally proposed the theory 
of cognitive dissonance in 1957 and since that time the theory has been extensively 
researched.  In cognitive dissonance theory Festinger (1957) outlined what would happen 
when 2 or more cognitions that people held, or also when cognitions people held and 
behaviors they engaged in, were dissonant.  Festinger (1957) proposed that when people 
recognized that their cognitions alone or cognitions and behaviors together were in a state 
of dissonance, they would experience an uncomfortable state of psychological tension 
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and would be driven to reduce that tension (usually through means of attitude change 
regarding one of the cognitions involved in the dissonant state).  It has long been believed 
that this state of tension is directly caused by physiological arousal.  Even though the 
theory as Festinger originally proposed it has undergone revisions, the notion that 
physiological arousal is at the core of the dissonance state has remained integral to the 
theory. 
 Support for this aspect of the theory has come from a number of sources. Early 
on, researchers used misattribution approaches to infer that arousal was present when 
dissonance was induced (Zanna and Cooper, 1974).  The misattribution approach 
required researchers to convince participants that they would be feeling either aroused or 
relaxed due to some clear external source. Once participants were convinced that the 
external source was causing them to feel as they did (either aroused or relaxed), the 
researchers then engaged participants in a dissonance induction manipulation.  The 
researchers hypothesized that those individuals who were led to attribute their arousal to 
an external source would not show attitude change in response to the dissonance 
induction.  Conversely, it was hypothesized that participants led to believe that they 
would be relaxed by the external source would show attitude change due to the 
dissonance induction.  Researchers believed this would be the case, because those 
participants who already believed that something else was making them feel aroused 
would not feel the need to change their attitudes (in order to reduce the arousal created by 
the dissonance induction) because they could easily attribute their arousal to the external 
source.  However, those who had nothing to misattribute their aroused state to would 
correctly perceive that the aroused feeling they were experiencing was due to the 
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dissonant action they had just engaged in, and they would change their attitudes to deal 
with their feelings of arousal.  This in fact is exactly what researchers found.   
 Since the early days of cognitive dissonance research, many new experimental 
paradigms for inducing dissonance have been designed to create dissonance.  One of the 
most well known and most frequently used involves a writing task.  In this paradigm, 
participants write counter-attitudinal statements under conditions of either high or low 
choice about the topic they write on.  The idea behind this paradigm was that when 
people write something they do not believe in, that it would create a dissonant condition 
between the expressed statement made in the writing task and their personal beliefs.  
Further, if individuals were able to tell themselves that they had no choice but to write 
what they were told to write, then they would have an excuse for why they committed the 
act that was dissonant and they would not feel the arousal due to the dissonant act.  
However, if they freely chose to write the counter-attitudinal statements, then they would 
feel arousal due to the knowledge that they had freely acted in a dissonant fashion 
because they would not be able to blame their actions on anyone but themselves.  The 
creation of arousal and the following change in target attitudes after the dissonance 
induction writing task is exactly what researchers found when they have tested the 
counter attitudinal essay paradigm (Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Losch & Cacioppo, 1990).   
 Continuing work on the writing paradigm has also revealed various conditions 
under which the writing task can be carried out and still create dissonance in the 
participants.  For instance, it has been found that it is possible to create dissonance in 
participants who write the counter attitudinal statements in an anonymous fashion by 
either not writing their name on the paper they write on, by throwing away the paper 
afterwards or both (Harmon-Jones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon & Nelson, 1996).  Also, it 
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has been found that dissonance can be created even when participants are "forced" to 
write on a specific topic (Gaes, Melburg & Tedeschi, 1986; Harmon-Jones, Brehm, 
Greenberg, Simon & Nelson, 1996; Stone, 2003).  On the surface, this would seem to go 
against the necessity of having the high choice/low choice conditions mentioned earlier.  
However, what has been found is that if participants are merely politely persuaded or 
asked to write on a specific topic, and if they are also told a number of times that they 
don't have to write about that topic if they don't really want to, they will often perceive 
that they are writing about the topic of their own free will, even though in the end they 
are really writing on the exact topic that the experimenter wanted them to.  Lastly, it has 
also been found that if participants are provided with the statements to make and merely 
follow what they are told to say, that they will feel dissonance just as strongly as do 
people who come up with their own personal arguments (Elkin & Leippe, 1986; Gaes, 
Melburg & Tedeschi, 1986).   
Croyle and Cooper (1983) provided the first direct physiological evidence that 
dissonance does indeed produce an arousal response.  These authors used nonspecific 
skin conductance responses (SCRs) to measure participant's autonomic arousal to provide 
evidence that cognitive dissonance does indeed create physiological arousal.  These 
authors placed one group of participants in a situation where they freely made their own 
choice to write a counter-attitudinal essay.  As compared to a second group which was 
given no choice but to write a counter-attitudinal essay, and a third group that wrote a 
pro-attitudinal essay, the authors found that only the first group showed physiological 
arousal (as measured by SCRs) due to the task of writing an essay.  Croyle and Cooper 
(1983) concluded that freely acting in a counter-attitudinal manner does indeed induce 
arousal in people.  Subsequent experiments also used physiological means to confirm the 
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previous findings that arousal was present when dissonance was induced (Etgen and 
Rosen, 1993; Elkin and Leippe, 1986).  
Most important, Losch and Cacioppo (1990) showed that it was not simply 
general physiological arousal that led to dissonance reduction efforts, but instead it was a 
state of negatively affectively laden arousal that was at work.  If it is true that primary 
psychopaths are less affected by emotionally negative stimuli, experience low levels of 
negative affect (if they experience any at all), and are deficient in their learned responses 
to punishment (as exhibited in poor passive avoidance learning and low BIS arousal), 
then compared to secondary psychopaths and non-psychopaths, they should show clear 
differences in their responses to a cognitive dissonance induction.  Furthermore, Cooper 
and Fazio (1984) proposed that based on the evidence about dissonance theory, 
dissonance arousal could be thought of as a conditioned emotional response.  Given the 
previous research suggesting that primary psychopaths are deficient in their BIS 
activation to conditioned punishments, it should follow that they would not show the 
arousal response that would lead to feelings of dissonance.  Therefore, as the second 
purpose for this dissertation, I propose to utilize a cognitive dissonance induction 
paradigm to test the hypothesis that after the induction paradigm has been completed, 
primary psychopaths will not attempt to reduce cognitive dissonance (because they do 
not feel the uncomfortable arousal which would drive them to do so), whereas secondary 
psychopaths and non-psychopaths will behave as normal individuals would and attempt 
to reduce feelings of arousal due to dissonance.  If this is the case, this will further extend 
the field's knowledge about the psychopathy construct.  It may also help explain why 
primary psychopaths feel no remorse for their actions and find it so easy to lie and 
manipulate individuals.  Without the physiological feelings that give rise to cognitive 
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dissonance, they would not be bothered when their actions or words are dissonant with 
their later behaviors. 
 Optimism.  Lastly, a previously unstudied construct in the field of psychopathy 
research will be investigated in this study.  This construct is that of positive expectancy 
(which has most frequently been studied under the rubric of optimism and has been 
conceptualized as a general expectation that good outcomes will come from one's efforts 
(Scheier & Carver, 1985; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994)).  This construct is of interest 
here in part because of it's strong prior relations with variables that have been 
consistently shown to help differentiate between primary and secondary psychopaths.  
The construct of optimism has been discussed since Descartes (Domino & Conway, 
2001), yet it was the work of Carver and Scheier in the 1980's that really moved the 
construct into the respectable mainstream of psychological research.  Even though the 
construct was not new, Scheier and Carver made great strides regarding the construct 
when they developed the first important measures of trait optimism called the Life 
Orientation Test (LOT) (Scheier & Carver, 1985) and its later revision (LOT-R) (Scheier, 
Carver & Bridges, 1994), by far the most widely used research measures of optimism or 
of any conceptualization of positive expectancy.   
 To date, most of the research on optimism has focused on topics such as health 
outcomes (Carver et al., 1993; Irving et al., 1998; Scheier & Carver, 1985; Scheier et al., 
1986; Snyder, 1996, 1998; Snyder, Feldman et al., 2000), risky behaviors (among them 
alcohol and drug abuse) (Brown et al., 2002; Carvajal, Clair, Nash & Evans, 1998; 
Carvajal, Evans, Nash & Getz, 2002; Grunbaum et al., 2000; Kashani et al., 1997; 
Magura et al., 2003; McCauley Ohannessian et al., 1993; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 
1994; Willinger et al., 2002), personal achievement (Currey, Snyder et al., 1997; Snyder, 
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Michael & Cheavens, 1999; Snyder, Hoza et al., 1997) and coping (Aspinwall & Taylor, 
1992; Carver et al., 1993; Cozzarelli, 1993; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994; Scheier, 
Weintraub & Carver, 1986; Shifren & Hooker, 1995; Strutton & Lumpkin, 1992).   
 It is interesting that even with all of the research on optimism noted above, after 
20 years there are no published studies in which attempts have been made to relate 
optimism (as measured with the LOT or LOT-R) to propensity for criminal behavior per 
se (the only illegal behaviors previously related to LOT measured optimism has been 
illegal substance use (Carvajal, Clair, Nash & Evans, 1998; Carvajal, Evans, Nash & 
Getz, 2002; McCauley Ohannessian et al., 1993; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994; 
Strack, Carver & Blaney, 1987)).  This lack of research on criminality and optimism is 
likely due to the fact that people do not seem to associate an optimistic attitude with 
criminal behavior.  Instead, people tend to think of optimism in regards to positive and/or 
socially acceptable behaviors such as those listed earlier.   
 Since optimism has not been studied in association with crime per se, it should 
come as no surprise that optimism has not been studied relative to its potential relations 
with psychopathy.  Yet previous research would seem to indicate that this construct is 
likely to be useful in differentiating between the two types of psychopaths.  For example, 
positive expectancies (not always as measured by the LOT or LOT-R) have been found 
to have associations with a number of external correlates that parallel those, summarized 
above, found with primary psychopathy.  For example, positive expectancies are 
inversely related to anxiety (Campbell & Kwon, 2001; Kwon, 2002; Lewis & Kliewer, 
1995; Raikkonen et al., 1999; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994), negative affect (Chang 
& Sanna, 2001; Kashani et al., 1997; Lucas, Diener & Suh, 1996; Raikkonen et al., 
1999), neuroticism (Mascaro, Rosen & Morey, 2004; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994), 
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suicide (Beck, Steer, Kovacks & Garrison, 1985; Kaslow et al., 2002; Meadows & 
Kaslow, 2002) and substance abuse (Bolland, 2003; Brown et al., 2002; Carvajal, Clair, 
Nash & Evans, 1998; Carvajal, Evans, Nash & Getz, 2002; Grunbaum et al., 2000; 
McCauley Ohannessian et al., 1993; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994; Willinger et al., 
2002).  Positive expectancies have also been found to be positively related to positive 
affect (Chang & Sanna, 2001; Kashani et al., 1997; Lucas, Diener & Suh, 1996; 
Raikkonen et al., 1999), narcissism (Harpur et al., 1989; Hickman, Watson & Morris, 
1996; McHoskey, Worzel & Szyarto, 1998; Reiss, Grubin & Meux, 1999), 
success/achievement (Curry, Snyder et al., 1997; Snyder, Michael & Cheavens, 1999; 
Snyder, Hoza et al., 1997), planning (Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994; Snyder et al., 
1991), persistence (Polivy & Herman, 2002), and conscientiousness (Mascaro, Rosen & 
Morey, 2004).  (see appendix A for citations and for a matrix of optimism/primary 
psychopathy relations).   
 Conversely, indicators of secondary psychopathy and measures of positive 
expectancies show opposing correlations with external criteria as, anxiety, neuroticism, 
suicide, negative affect, and substance abuse.  For all of these variables, responses by 
secondary psychopaths show positive correlations and responses from those high on 
positive expectancies show negative relations to these variables (see appendix B for 
citations and for matrix of optimism/secondary psychopathy relations).  On the other 
hand, indicators of secondary psychopathy are negatively correlated with measures of 
planning and conscientiousness, whereas the measures of positive expectancies have 
been found to be positively correlated with these same measures (see appendix B for 
citations and for matrix of optimism/secondary psychopathy relations).   
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 Based on the patterns of findings described above, it is hypothesized that (similar 
to anxiety) measures of trait optimism may differentiate between primary and secondary 
psychopaths.  Further, recent research suggests that optimism may also serve as a 
mediator between psychopathy and performance on some cognitively based tasks.  
Segerstrom (2001) showed that optimists show an unconscious attentional bias for 
positive stimuli.  Using a stroop task as a measure of unconscious automatic processing, 
Segerstrom showed that attentional bias for positive words increased as optimism 
increased, while attentional bias for negative stimuli decreased as optimism increased.  
This means that the more optimistic a person is, the more they unconsciously attend to 
positive stimuli in their environment at the expense of attending to the negative stimuli in 
their environment.  She also found that pessimism was related to faster skin conductance 
response rates than optimism when negative stimuli were presented.  This suggests that 
either optimists were not taking in all of the negative information they were presented, or 
that perhaps they were not as threatened by the negative information as were pessimists.  
Reviewing Newman's studies in light of the findings of Segerstrom's study, it would seem 
plausible that Newman's low anxious psychopaths may react the way they do to the 
passive avoidance tasks (commit more errors of commission) because of high levels of 
optimism which make them focus much more on positive stimuli (winning money at the 
task for making responses) and not feel as threatened by negative information such as 
losing money for making an error of commission.   
 Further, Gibson and Sanbonmatsu (2004) found that optimists and pessimists 
differed in their expectations of winning when gambling and in the degree to which they 
would persevere in gambling even while losing.  To begin with, the authors found that 
optimists reported having stronger beliefs than pessimists that they could win at 
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gambling.  Also, optimists were found to maintain this belief in their ability to win even 
in the face of losses.  In contrast, pessimists lowered their expectations about future wins 
when they recently lost money.  According to Cohen’s (1988) terminology, there was 
also a medium and statistically significant correlation (.37) between scores on the LOT-R 
and the belief that one could win in the long run.  This correlation indicated that optimists 
felt positive about their long term prospects of winning if they just persisted in their 
gambling behavior.  Also, these authors found that pessimists preferred to bet less after 
losses while optimists seemed insensitive to failure and did not change their betting 
habits after losses.   
 Further, according to the authors, optimists tended to overestimate past 
performance while pessimists tended to underestimate past performance.  Perhaps this 
was most clearly shown when all participants were put into identical controlled situations 
in which wins and losses were equal for everyone.  In this situation, optimists tended to 
recall more "near wins" in the lose condition than did pessimists, while there was no 
difference in "near win" perceptions for the win condition.  Therefore, the results of the 
Gibson and Sanbonmatsu (2004) study paints a picture of the optimistic gambler as 
someone who has higher expectations for winning, will bet more for longer and perceives 
many "near wins" in their losses.   
 A number of studies paint a similar picture of psychopaths as overly confident in 
their ability to win.  In the first of such studies, Seigel (1978), had psychopaths and non-
psychopaths play card games in which they could win or lose money depending on the 
type of card they turned over next from a preordered deck of cards.  Seigel (1978) found 
that psychopaths committed more errors of commission and also reported significantly 
higher beliefs than non-psychopaths that the next card they turned over would be a 
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winner.  Newman, Patterson and Kosson (1987) also used a card turning task in 
continuing to investigate deficits in passive avoidance in psychopaths.  They found that 
psychopaths showed perseveration in their behaviors as exhibited by continuing to play 
significantly further through a deck of cards (which had a steadily increasing rate of 
punishment per every 10 cards played) than did non-psychopaths.  When again this is 
considered in relation to optimism and its relations to the continued errors of commission 
committed by psychopaths in passive avoidance tasks, it seems plausible that optimism 
may be mediating the relationship between psychopathy and performance on passive 
avoidance tasks.   
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The Present Study 
Hypotheses 
 For the purpose of testing hypotheses 1-3, groups were created through means of 
cluster analyses techniques (details of the methods for this clustering are described in the 
results section).  Following from previous methodology in psychopathy research, clusters 
were created through the use of multiple measures that theoretically should separate 
primary and secondary psychopaths from each other (as well as from non-psychopathic 
individuals) in their responses.  Measures previously used for this purpose that I utilized 
for this study were: Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRSP), BIS/BAS scales, 
and the Harm Avoidance scale from the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire 
(MPQ-HA). Through use of these measures and the clustering techniques, I attempted to 
form groups whose cluster profiles best reflected the theoretical profiles of either primary 
psychopathy, secondary psychopathy or neither (which will be considered to be a non-
psychopath comparison group).  These groups were then used to test the following 
hypotheses: 
1(a). When engaging in a passive avoidance task (as designed and used in 
previous studies by Newman and colleagues), members of the primary 
psychopath cluster will commit significantly more passive avoidance 
errors than will either members of the secondary psychopath cluster or 
those in the non-psychopathic cluster.  These results will serve as a 
replication of much of the previous work on this topic, as well as setting 
up the necessary condition to test hypothesis 1(b). 
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1(b). Punishment frequency and intensity will act to moderate the number of 
passive avoidance errors for members of the primary psychopath cluster.  
Specifically, at higher levels of intensity and frequency of punishment, 
members of the primary psychopathy group will show significantly 
reduced levels of passive avoidance errors as compared to their own level 
of passive avoidance errors when frequency and intensity of punishment is 
lower. 
 2. Those in the primary psychopath cluster will exhibit significantly less  
  attitude change following a cognitive dissonance induction task, than will  
  those in either the secondary psychopath cluster or the non-psychopathic  
  cluster. 
 3. Members of the primary psychopath cluster will score significantly higher  
  on the LOT-R than will those in the secondary psychopath cluster. 
 4. Optimism, as measured on the LOT-R, will mediate the relationship  
  between primary psychopathy and the number of errors of commission  
  made on a card playing passive avoidance task. 
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Method 
Participants 
 Participants consisted of a convenience sample drawn from the population of a 
court ordered drug treatment program in southwestern Florida.  Participants were 
volunteers who were notified that they had the right to withdraw from the study at any 
time without fear of punishment.  Participants from this type of facility were used for this 
study due to the fact that in such a criminally convicted population, there was likely to be 
a higher proportion of individuals high on psychopathic traits than would be found in 
university classroom populations or other community samples.  To be eligible for 
participation, individuals had to have been: (a) be male; (b) be between the ages of 20 
and 50 inclusive; (c) be White, Black or Latino; (d) be English speaking; (e) be able to 
read and comprehend at at least a 9th grade level; (f) not be experiencing active 
symptoms of psychosis; (g) not have an IQ below 70. 
Measures 
 Demographics questionnaire.  This questionnaire asked basic demographic 
questions about age, education level, family makeup, and criminal history.  This 
questionnaire is being newly created for this study. 
 Intelligence.  Quick Test (QT; Ammons & Ammons, 1962).  The QT is a brief 
intelligence test based on perceptual-verbal performance.  Participants are asked to look 
at an 8.5 X 11 inch card with 4 different pictures on it.  Sequentially, a series of words is 
presented and the participant’s task is to point to the picture that illustrates the object or 
idea represented in each word.  The words steadily increase in difficulty level and the test 
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ends when the participant fails on 6 consecutive responses.  Reliability of the QT with an 
adult sample has been high at .86 and correlations with other IQ tests are also acceptable 
(.77 with Stanford-Binet and .96 with Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale). 
 Reading level.  Basic Reading Inventory (BRI; Johns, J. L., 1981).  The BRI is a 
reading and comprehension inventory.  If participants indicated that they had less than a 
9th grade education, the BRI was given to determine if they could read and comprehend 
at at least a 9th grade level.  The BRI consists of reading a 1 page multi-paragraph 
passage and answering a standardized set of questions about the passage afterwards. 
 Psychopathy.  Levinson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRPS; Levenson, Kiehl 
& Fitzpatrick, 1995).  The SRPS Is a 26-item self-report questionnaire designed to 
measure psychopathy.  Although designed for use with non-institutionalized samples, it 
has also been used with institutionalized groups as well (Brinkley et al., 2001).  Factor 
analyses have shown that 16 items load onto a factor which Levenson contends are 
conceptually similar to primary psychopathy and the remaining 10 items load onto a 
factor that Levenson believes to be conceptually similar to the characteristics of 
secondary psychopathy.  The 26 items are completed by using a 4-point scale, which 
ranges from "Disagree strongly" on one end, to "Agree strongly" on the other.  Internal 
reliability for the primary psychopathy items has been found to be .82 and for the 
secondary psychopathy items internal reliability has been found to be .63 (Levenson, 
Kiehl & Fitzpatrick, 1995).  Test-retest reliability over an 8 week period has been found 
to be .83 (Lynam, Whiteside & Jones, 1999).  The SRPS was used as the psychopathy 
measure of choice for this study due to previous relations that have been found between 
Newman's Go-No-Go task and psychopathy (as assessed by the SRPS (Brinkley et al., 
(2001); Lynam, Whiteside & Jones (1999)).  These previous relations were important in 
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showing that the passive avoidance effects have been replicated before I assessed how 
increases in the severity and frequency of punishment may moderate those same effects. 
 Anxiety.  Welsh Anxiety Scale (WAS; Welsh, 1956).  The WAS is a 39-item true-
false scale derived from the MMPI that measures anxiety and relates to negative affect 
more generally.  The items from the WAS tap four aspects of anxiety: trouble 
concentrating, negative affect, low energy/pessimism, personal sensitivity.  Previous 
study of the WAS has determined that it has excellent internal consistency of between 
.92-.94 (Graham, 1987; Hale et al., 2004) 
 Behavioral inhibition/behavioral activation.  Behavioral Inhibition/Behavioral 
Activation Scales (BIS/BAS; Carver and White, 1994).  These scales were created to 
assess individuals' responses to potentially rewarding or punishing events.  This measure 
consists of 20 items which are completed by using a 4-point scale, which ranges from 
"Agree strongly" on one end, to "Disagree strongly" on the other.  Of the 20 items, the 
BIS scale consists of 7 items and the BAS scale consists of 13 items.  Further, within the 
BAS scale there are 3 correlated subscales: Reward Responsiveness (5); Drive (4 items); 
Fun Seeking (4 items).  Previous use of the BIS/BAS scales have shown that these 
measures have acceptable internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha = .76 (BIS) and .83 
(BAS)) and test-retest reliability for the BAS ranging from .59 (Reward Responsiveness) 
to .69 (Fun Seeking) (Jorm et al., 1999). 
 Attitudes.  Cognitive Dissonance Attitude Measure.  This measure contained 10 
questions asking participants to rate their attitudes on a number of topics relating to 
current personal issues.  The items were completed using a 10-point scale that ranged 
from "Strongly Agree" on one end, to "Strongly Disagree" on the other.  On this measure, 
9 of the 10 items are distracter items intended to keep the participant from focusing on 
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the 1 item that they will be writing about during the cognitive dissonance induction task 
(described below).  Participants completed this measure twice (once before the cognitive 
induction task and once again immediately after the task).  This measure was newly 
created for this study. 
 Manipulation check.  Freedom of choice manipulation check.  Participants were 
asked to rate how free they felt to choose to write the statement that they wrote in the 
cognitive dissonance induction task.  The question was administered at the end of the 
experiment and consisted of an 11-point scale which ranges from "Not at all free to 
choose" on one end to "Completely free to choose" on the other. 
 Optimism.  Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 
1994).  The LOT-R was developed to tap generalized positive expectancies.  This scale 
consists of 10 items (4 of which are filler items) that are completed by using a 5-point 
scale, which ranges from "Strongly disagree" on one end, to "Strongly agree" on the 
other.  Higher scores on the LOT-R indicate greater dispositional optimism.  Previous use 
of the LOT-R has shown this measure to have acceptable internal reliability (Cronbach's 
alpha = .78) and test-retest reliability (r = .79) over 28 months (Scheier, Carver & 
Bridges, 1994). 
 Fearlessness.  Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire--Harm Avoidance 
scale (MPQ-HA; Tellegen, in press).  The full MPQ is an omnibus index of normal 
personality traits consisting of 11 primary scales and 3 higher order factors.  In order to 
assess the personality trait of fearfulness, the Harm Avoidance scale from the MPQ was 
used.  The Harm Avoidance scale consists of 28 questions on which an individual must 
either choose which of two presented scenarios are preferable to engage in, or confirm or 
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deny that they would like to engage in a singularly presented scenario.  Internal reliability 
for this scale is acceptable at .76 (Patrick, Curtin and Telligen, 2002). 
 Go-No-Go passive avoidance task.  Go-No-Go task.  Following Newman and 
colleagues’ methods, participants were presented with 10 blocks of trials in which one of 
ten, 2-digit numbers appeared alone on a computer screen.  In each block, half (5) of the 
numbers were positive stimuli that rewarded the participant for a response (rewarded by 
winning 10 cents) and the other half punished the participant for a response (punished by 
losing 10 cents).  Within each block, the order of the stimuli were controlled such that no 
more than three consecutive rewarding or punishing stimuli were presented.  The task of 
the participant was to press a button only when a rewarding stimulus was on the 
computer screen and to withhold responding when a punishing stimulus was presented on 
the screen.  The trials began with an unrecorded practice session consisting of ten 
consecutive rewarded stimuli.  This practice session existed to promote operant 
conditioning of a button pushing response set.  After the practice block, the recorded 
portion of the task began.  Participants were presented with all trials and it was up to 
them to decide whether to respond to the presented stimuli.  Further, the participants had 
an appropriate number of poker chips (representing 10 cents each) placed in front of them 
or taken away from them to make salient how much money they were winning or losing 
for each response they gave.  White chips were placed in front of each participant to 
show how much had been won at any point in the task.  When any participant lost enough 
to come to the point of being under 0 cents, then red poker chips (also representing 10 
cents each) were placed in front of the participant to show how much had been lost for 
the responses given. 
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 Modified Go-No-Go passive avoidance task.  In order to determine if increasing 
the frequency and intensity of punishment reduced the commission of passive avoidance 
errors by those in the primary psychopathy group, the Go-No-Go task as described above 
was modified.  As with the usual version of the task, 10 blocks of trials were presented 
which contained 10 stimuli per block.  The task also still presented 10 stimuli (half of 
which were rewarded and half of which were punished for responding to) to participants.  
Unlike the normal version of this task, the frequency and intensity of the presentation of 
the punishing stimuli increased across the 10 blocks of trials.  To begin with, the 
participants were again given an unrecorded practice session consisting of ten 
consecutive rewarded stimuli.  After the practice session, the recorded portion of the task 
began.  In the case of this modified task, the first 4 presented blocks proceeded as normal 
with this task.  That is, half of the stimuli presented were rewarded and half were 
punished for responses.  Further, on each of these first 4 trials, participants were punished 
by losing 10 cents for each improper press of the response button.  To increase the 
frequency and intensity of punishment, the next 3 trials (5th through 7th) presented 
rewards only 30% of the time with the punishment for each improper pressing of the 
response button increased to 20 cents.  To further increase the frequency and intensity of 
punishment, the final 3 trials (8th through 10th) presented no rewarding stimuli at all and 
punishment for each improper pressing of the response button was increased to 30 cents.  
As with the normal version of the Go-No-Go task, participants were presented with all 
trials and it was up to them to decide on their own how often to respond to the presented 
stimuli.  Also, as with the normal Go-No-Go task, participants had an appropriate number 
of white or red poker chips (representing 10 cents each) placed in front of them or taken 
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away from them to make salient how much money they were winning or losing for each 
response they gave.  
 Card playing perseveration task.  Following Newman's methods (Newman, 
Patterson and Kosson, 1987), participants were presented with a series of trials in which a 
series of 100 cards were presented face down (and one at a time) on a computer screen.  
Some of the cards were rewarding stimuli and some were punishing stimuli.  The trials 
were presented beginning with a practice block of ten trials, in which all stimuli 
presented were rewarding stimuli.  Following this practice block, 10 blocks were 
presented in which the percentage of potentially rewarding stimuli decreased by 10% 
with each block starting with 90% in the initial block (i.e. 9 out of the first 10 were 
rewarding, then 8 out of the next 10 and so on).  The blocks ended with 0% of the stimuli 
being presented being rewarding stimuli.   
Participants were rewarded with 10 cents for each press of a button which 
revealed a rewarding stimuli (a winning card was turned up) and were punished by losing 
10 cents for every press of a button which revealed a punishing stimulus (a losing card 
was turned up).  Participants were informed that during the course of the task, after each 
stimulus was presented, they were allowed to press a button to either continue onwards 
with the task, and see if the next card was a winner or loser, or to press a different button 
to quit the task immediately.  They were also informed that the task did not include a 
standard deck of cards so that they could not predict how many of each card would 
appear.  The objective was to record how far through the deck different types of 
individuals would continue to play before they either choose to end the task or they ran 
out of the 100 cards to play through.  Objectively, once the 50% point of rewarding and 
punishing stimuli per block was reached, it was no longer advantageous to continue to 
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play the game.  As with the Go-No-Go task, the participants had an appropriate number 
of white or red poker chips (representing 10 cents each) placed in front of them or taken 
away from them to make salient how much money they were winning or losing for each 
response they gave. 
Procedure 
 Recruitment and consenting procedures.  With approval from DACCO, a sign up 
sheet was made available to clients of the residential drug treatment program so that 
those with interest in participating or finding out more about the study could voluntarily 
sing up to have the researcher speak to them later about participating in the study.  One at 
a time, the researcher introduced himself to each individual whose name was on the list, 
and if the potential participant reported continued interest in the study, then the 
researcher privately sat down with the potential participant and determined if all 
eligibility requirements were met.  Informed consent was obtained using procedures 
approved by the University of South Florida Institutional Review Board.  If the potential 
participant met eligibility criteria then the researcher described the study in greater detail 
and had the interested individual fully read the consent form and discuss its contents.  If 
after reading over and discussing the consent form, the potential participant was still 
interested in participating, then they were asked to sign the consent form and were then 
considered an enrolled participant in the study. 
 Protocol.  After the study began, the enrolled participant was brought to a private 
room inside DACCO for the experiment.  The study began with the use of the cognitive 
dissonance attitude measure to determine the participant's attitudes on a specific topic.  
As mentioned earlier, this measure had 10 items, however, only one of the ten was a 
critical item on which attitude change was expected to been detected after the cognitive 
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dissonance manipulation had been completed.  All of the other nine questions were 
designed to be distracter items.  Once the attitudes measure was completed, the 
participant completed the LOT-R and MPQ-HA on paper, and completed the 
computerized card task on a laptop computer.   
 Following these tasks, the participant took part in the dissonance induction task.  
For this task, the participant was given a piece of paper containing three short statements 
of equivalent length and compositional structure.  Participants were asked to choose 
which of the three statements they felt made the best argument for a topic and then to 
copy their choice of the "best" argument onto another piece of paper.  With the assistance 
of DACCO personnel, the specific content of all three of the statements to choose from 
were designed such that they would have a very high likelihood of being counter-
attitudinal to those who were receiving services at DACCO.  Before the participant chose 
and copied a statement from the given list, they were asked to not write their name on the 
paper, thus leaving themselves anonymous in the end.  Once the statement had been 
completely copied, the participant was asked to tear up and throw away the paper they 
just wrote on.  Once this was done, the cognitive induction task was over.  Following this 
task, the participant filled out the cognitive dissonance attitude measure again to 
determine if there had been any attitude change on the critical item due to the cognitive 
dissonance induction.   
 Next they completed the WAS, SRPS, and BIS/BAS scales.  Across participants, 
the LOT-R/MPQ-HA and WAS/SRPS/BIS/BAS questionnaires were administered in a 
counter-balanced order (pre or post the cognitive induction task) in an effort to reduce the 
possibility of order effects for these measures.  Lastly, the computerized Go-No-Go and 
modified Go-No-Go tasks were completed.  The participants were informed prior to 
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beginning the computerized tasks that the person with the highest combined scores from 
these tasks would receive an extra $20 from the experiment.  This was done in an effort 
to increase the degree of cognitive engagement by the participants regarding their 
performance on the computerized tasks.  Once the participant completed these computer 
tasks, the freedom of choice question was given to confirm that the participant felt free to 
choose what to write on in the cognitive induction task.  When this was completed, the 
experiment was over and the participant was paid $10 (into their institutional account at 
DACCO) for their time and effort.   
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Analysis Plan 
Clustering Technique 
 Cluster analysis was used in an effort to identify groups of individuals with 
profiles on clustering variables that most closely fit the characteristics of primary and 
secondary psychopathy.  This type of analysis has successfully been used in previous 
studies to understand psychopathy and its subtypes (Hicks et al., 2004).  Model-based 
clustering was conducted with a computer package called MCLUST (Fraley, 1998).  
Model-based clustering is designed to analyze the data and estimate the number of 
subpopulations and then assign each individual to a subpopulation using cluster 
algorithms.  Then, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Fraley and Raftery, 2003) 
is used to evaluate the fit of each model produced by the algorithms.    
In MCLUST, the BIC value represents the goodness of fit of any of the models 
that are created by the program.  The BIC balances this goodness of fit with parsimony in 
each model and the better fitting models will have less negative BIC values associated 
with them (Raftery, 1995).  By rule of thumb, models that have BIC values that differ by 
more than 6 from the best fitting model are not considered to be viable for explaining the 
relations of the data.  For example, a BIC difference of 10 would indicate that the least 
negative BIC value has a 150:1 chance of being the better fitting model for the data 
(Raftery, 1995).  On the other hand, a model that has a BIC value that differs by 6 has a 
20:1 chance (20:1 being equivalent to p = .05) of being the better fitting model for the 
data (Raftery, 1995).  Therefore, cluster solutions within 6 BIC values of the best fitting 
  43
model are considered viable and the appropriateness of each of those solutions should be 
evaluated based on the predictions of relations between variables from prior theory.   
The variables used to cluster participants into groups for this study consisted of 
factor or subscale scores from the SRPS, BIS, BAS, and MPQ-HA measures that have 
theoretically prescribed associations that have previously been shown to help 
differentiate individuals into primary or secondary psychopathic experimental groups.  It 
was determined before the start of this study that should any of the MCLUST analyses 
with these measures yield a multi-group solution that included groups with profiles 
consistent with the theoretical profiles for primary, secondary and a non-psychopathic 
group, then hypothesis testing would proceed as detailed below with participants 
separated into the 3 groups (primary, secondary and non-psychopathic) as formed by the 
clustering technique. 
 It was further decided that should the MCLUST techniques not produce a multi-
group solution as expected, then the formation of primary, secondary and non-
psychopathic groups would proceed in a similar fashion as Newman and colleagues have 
used in the majority of their studies.  Newman's method has been to group individuals 
based on their scores on a psychopathy measure and an anxiety measure.  Newman has 
taken those who both score at or above the cut off of 30 on the PCL-R and also score 
below the median on an anxiety measure (usually the WAS) and labels that group "low 
anxiety psychopaths" (which is analogous to primary psychopaths).  He then takes those 
who score both above the cut off of >30 on the PCL-R and also score above the median 
on the anxiety measure and labels that group "high anxiety psychopaths" (which is 
analogous to secondary psychopaths).  Anyone who scores below 20 on the PCL-R is 
considered non-psychopathic.   
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Due to the highly intensive and time consuming nature of the PCL-R, a brief self-
report measure of psychopathy was used. When the need arose to create groups based on 
scores from a single psychopathy measure (as Newman has done in the past), the SRPS 
was used in combination with an accompanying anxiety measure (the WAS) to split the 
sample into three different groups for hypothesis testing.  For the purposes of this study, 
those participants who scored > .5 standard deviations above the mean on the SRPS have 
been considered psychopathic individuals.  Greater than .5 standard deviations above the 
mean was believed to be appropriate in capturing those with the requisite traits, since 
recent studies have supported a dimensional construct rather than a categorical one which 
may require a more extreme cut off. 
 Regardless of which method was used to create the groups for hypothesis testing, 
the statistical tests used to test the hypotheses were conducted with variables other than 
those used in the initial grouping of participants (i.e., the SRPS, BIS, BAS, and HA 
scales).  This was done in order to ensure that the grouping variables and criterion 
variables were independent from one another.  
Planned Statistical Analyses 
 Regarding hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b) and their predictions about the performance 
by members of the primary psychopathy cluster on passive avoidance tasks.  A repeated 
measures ANOVA was planned to determine if significant differences existed between 
groups on the normal Go-No-Go task, as well as to determine if there was an interaction 
between punishment intensity/frequency levels and group membership in regards to the 
number of passive avoidance errors committed on the modified Go-No-Go task.  To use a 
repeated measures ANOVA, it was necessary to have one or more independent variables 
(one of which must be within subjects) and one dependent variable.  For this study, there 
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existed three levels of punishment regarding the two Go-No-Go tasks.  These levels of 
punishment served as a within subjects independent variable in the repeated measures 
design.  Level one consisted of the normal Go-No-Go task as used in previous studies.  
Level two consisted of the modified levels of punishment intensity/frequency when a 
participant was punished 70% of the time and each punishment cost the participant 20 
cents instead of the normal 10 cents.  Level three consisted of the highest modified levels 
of punishment intensity/frequency when a participant is punished 100% of the time and 
each punishment cost the participant 30 cents instead of the previous 10 or 20 cents.  This 
study also contained a between groups independent variable, which was psychopathy 
group membership (primary, secondary, non-psychopathic).  Lastly, the dependent 
variable measured for this analysis was the number of passive avoidance errors 
committed on the two Go-No-Go tasks.  The repeated measures ANOVA was proposed 
to test hypothesis 1(a) by determining if there was a significant difference across the 
between groups dependent variable at the first level of the Go-No-Go task.  Hypothesis 
1(b) was to be assessed through testing for an interaction between the within subjects 
variable (levels of punishment intensity/frequency) and the between subjects variable 
(psychopathy group) on the number of passive avoidance errors committed.  A significant 
interaction term for this analysis would be indicative of the presence of moderation 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986).  Specifically, it was expected that those in the primary 
psychopathy group would show a reduction in the number of passive avoidance errors as 
the intensity and frequency of punishment increased, while the number of passive 
avoidance errors from the other two groups would remain statistically unchanged. 
 Regarding hypothesis (2) and its prediction about participant's degree of attitude 
change in response to a dissonance induction protocol.  Orthogonal planned comparisons 
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utilizing a one-way ANCOVA (with pre cognitive dissonance induction attitudes serving 
as the covariate) were utilized to determine if a significant difference in attitudes existed 
between the primary psychopathy group, the secondary psychopathy group and the non-
psychopathic group after completing the cognitive induction task.  
 Regarding hypothesis (3) and its prediction regarding group differences in 
optimism as measured by the LOT-R.  A t-test was used to determine whether the mean 
score for the primary psychopathy group was significantly higher on the LOT-R than that 
of the secondary psychopathy group. 
 Regarding hypothesis (4), that optimism would mediate between primary 
psychopathy and the number of errors of commission. For this analysis, participants were 
no longer be grouped according to clustering techniques described earlier.  Participant's 
scores on the SRPS were used to determine the extent to which they showed primary 
psychopathic traits.  Further, statistical methods outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986) 
were used to test for mediation in this predicted relation.  Optimism (as measured by the 
LOT-R) would be considered to have been a mediator if the following were met: (a) 
variations in the level of primary psychopathy significantly accounted for variations in 
optimism, (b) variations in optimism significantly accounted for variations in the number 
of cards played (i.e. passive avoidance errors), (c) variations in level of primary 
psychopathy significantly accounted for variations in number of cards played, (d) after 
controlling statistically for optimism, a previously significant relation between level of 
primary psychopathy and number of cards played was no longer significant.  In order to 
statistically test for relations (a) thru (d), three regression equations were to be conducted.  
First, optimism was to be regressed onto primary psychopathy.  Second, number of cards 
played (i.e. passive avoidance errors) was to regressed onto primary psychopathy.  Third, 
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number cards played was to be regressed onto optimism followed by primary 
psychopathy.  If primary psychopathy affected optimism in the first equation and primary 
psychopathy affected number of cards played in the second equation and primary 
psychopathy affected number cards played less in the third equation than in the second 
equation, then mediation by optimism will have been shown to exist. 
Statistical Power  
 Sample size was determined by considerations of statistical power as described by 
Cohen (1988).  Regarding hypotheses 1a and 1b, a repeated measures ANOVA was 
planned for use to analyze the data.  With an pre-study estimated medium effect size of 
.25, and a p level of .05, a sample size of 52 participants would have been required to 
give a power of .80 to detect a difference between group means for this analysis.  
Regarding the second hypothesis, a one-way ANCOVA was to be utilized to analyze the 
data.  With a pre-study estimated medium effect size of .25, and a p level of .05, a sample 
size of 52 participants would have been required to give a power of .80 to detect a 
difference between group means for this ANCOVA analysis.  Regarding the third 
hypothesis, t-tests were planned for use to analyze the data.  With a pre-study estimated 
medium effect size of .40 for t-tests, and a p level of .05, a sample size of 100 
participants would have been required to give a power of .80.  Regarding the fourth 
hypothesis utilizing regressions to determine mediation, by rule of thumb, using 3 
independent variables in a simultaneous regression equation would require 74 
participants to achieve a power level of .8.  The number of variables being entered at any 
one time for the regression analyses being used to analyze the fourth hypothesis 
(mediation by optimism) was to have been no more than 3, which means that the analysis 
for this hypothesis would not require more participants to reach a power level of .8, than 
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did hypothesis two.  Lastly, using a simple rule of thumb, it was expected that 150 
participants would have been required to create sufficiently stable groups (based on the 
MCLUST technique) in order to produce reliable outcomes from the hypothesis testing.  
Therefore, since this analysis demanded the most participants, 150 participants were 
recruited to achieve pre-study estimates of appropriate power for all planned analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Results 
 
MCLUST Outcomes 
Responses to the SRPS, BIS, BAS and HA scales were used to attempt to cluster 
participants into discrete groups.  For analyses, the data from these measures were 
converted into Z-scores, and once in Z-score form, the data was ready for MCLUST 
analyses.  Optimal cluster solutions were selected according to BIC criterion (described 
earlier).  The patterns of mean Z-scores on clustering variables for the emergent groups 
were then examined to determine if they included profiles consistent with the theoretical 
profiles for primary and secondary psychopathic individuals.    
Several MCLUST analyses were conducted in an attempt to identify groups 
whose profiles were plausibly interpretable as representing primary and secondary 
psychopathy.  Initially all participants were included in cluster analyses that used various 
plausible combinations of the above variables (see Table 1 for examples of plausible 
combinations used) that would potentially lead to groupings of cases that should fit 
theory regarding personality profiles of primary and secondary psychopathy.  However, 
none of these analyses yielded cluster solutions that included group profiles that 
adequately matched the theory-based a priori profiles for psychopathy subtypes as 
previously detailed in Figure 1. 
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Table 1 
 
Examples of Plausible Combinations of Clustering Variables Used in MCLUST Analyses 
________________________________________________________________________ 
-SRPS total score, HA total score 
-SRPS total score, HA total score, BIS, BAS 
-SRPS total score, HA total score, BIS, BAS-Drive, BAS-Reward  Responsiveness 
-SRPS total score, HA total score, BIS, BAS-Fun 
-SRPS -Primary scale, SRPS -Secondary scale, HA total score 
-SRPS -Primary scale, SRPS -Secondary scale, HA total score, BIS, BAS 
 
 
Figure 1 
Theory-Based A Priori Profiles for Psychopathy Subtypes
 
Primary Secondary Non-Psychopathic
SRPS-P SRPS-S HA BIS         BAS-R      BAS-DR      BAS-F       WAS
High
Middle
Low
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Therefore, a secondary clustering strategy was employed.  First, the sample was 
split into two parts by using a cut score of .5 standard deviations above the mean on the 
total score for the psychopathy measure (SRPS).  Those individuals who scored below 
this cut score were then considered to be non-psychopathic.  Those with SRPS total 
scores > .5 standard deviations above the mean were defined as psychopathic and their 
responses on the clustering measures were subjected to the same MCLUST procedures as 
before.  Unlike the initial cluster analyses that utilized all subjects, with this new sample, 
it was no longer necessary to find a three-group solution to create the groups for later 
analyses of the study hypotheses.  What was needed at this point was a solution that 
included at least two groups, whose cluster variable profiles, when plotted using mean Z-
scores, approximately matched the a priori profiles that represent primary and secondary 
psychopathy.   
The subsequent MCLUST results yielded a single solution that best fit the data 
according to BIC criteria and which had aspects which approximately fit a priori theory 
regarding psychopathy when scores on criterion variables were plotted using Z-scores 
(see Figure 2).  Of the various plausible combinations of the above variables that were 
used, this solution used scores from the primary and secondary SRPS scales and the HA 
scale to identify the clusters.    
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Figure 2 
Results of MCLUST Analysis 
P = Primary  
S = Secondary 
N = Non-Psychopathic 
 
-1.5
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0
0.5
1
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p 0.927 0.819 -1.02 -0.057 0.061 0.561 0.716 0.393
s 0.857 0.611 0.71 0.199 0.273 0.252 0.278 0.316
n -0.553 -0.472 0.066 -0.042 -0.074 -0.254 -0.287 -0.221
srps-p srps-s ha bis bas-r bas-dr bas-f was
Cluster variables Hold out variables
 Further details about the outcome from the plotting of Z-scores using criterion 
variables should be mentioned.  As shown in Figure 2, the solution positioned those in 
one cluster as highest on the primary and secondary scales of the SRPS (and well above 
those in the non-psychopathic group).  It also placed those in this same cluster much 
lower on the HA scale than either those in the other cluster or those in the previously 
carved out non-psychopathic group.  Plots also indicated that those in the cluster with the 
highest primary SRPS scores, had a weaker BIS than those in the other cluster.  However, 
the plots for the BAS scales were less clear in their theoretical support of this solution.  
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The BAS reward responsiveness subscale agreed with prior theory, however, scores for 
the BAS drive and fun subscales were more elevated for the cluster that was highest on 
the SRPS scale.  Overall though, Figure 2 shows that the profiles for the two groups 
which contained participants who were .5 standard deviations above the mean on the 
SRPS scale were an imperfect match to prior theory as to what would be expected of 
primary and secondary psychopathic groups.  Although the fit to prior theory was not 
perfect, there appeared to be enough similarity (i.e., one group high on fearfulness and 
the other low as Lykken contended) to move forward with testing the study hypotheses.  
For testing the hypotheses, the cluster that is highest on the SRPS scale will be labeled 
the primary psychopathy group, and the other group created by the clustering solution 
will be labeled the secondary psychopathy group.  Finally, the group with SRPS scores 
less than .5 standard deviations above the mean was designated the non-psychopathic 
group.  Due to the imperfect fit of the MCLUST groupings, groups were also formed and 
analyzed according to the built in back up strategy (i.e., Newman’s method) for testing 
hypotheses.    
Participant Characteristics 
Data was collected from 150 male participants at a local residential drug 
treatment agency.  Characteristics that were assessed included: age, race, education level, 
and criminal history (i.e., convictions of misdemeanors and felonies, and number of times 
sent to prison).  Table 2 details the demographic characteristics for the total sample as 
well as for the two psychopathic and one non-psychopathic group formed after utilizing 
the MCLUST program. 
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Table 2 
 
Participant Characteristics 
 
 Total Non-Psychopathic Primary Secondary 
 (N=150) (N=93) (N=27) (N=30) 
 
Age (years)  
  Mean (SD) 32.8(9.6) 33.1(9.6) 32.9(10.4) 31.7(9.9)  
Race/Ethnicity 
  White  59% 59% 70% 50% 
  Black 26% 26% 15% 36% 
  Hispanic 15% 15% 15% 14% 
Education 
  < high school  55% 52% 52% 67% 
  If < high school,  
  have GED? (%yes) 51% 50% 50% 52% 
  High school diploma 31% 32% 37% 22% 
  At least some  
  college 14% 16% 11% 11% 
Criminal history 
  % convicted of  
  past misdemeanors 83% 80% 85% 89% 
  # of misdemeanor 
  convictions  
        Mean (SD) 3.2(3.5) 2.9(3.2) 4.3(4.7) 3.2(3.3) 
  % convicted of 
  past felonies 82%  80% 89% 82% 
  # of felony  
  convictions 
        Mean (SD) 3.5(5.6) 3.2(5.5) 3.5(3.4) 4.6(7.5) 
  % sent to prison  
  for a past crime 29% 26% 30% 36% 
  # times in prison 
        Mean (SD) .68(1.5) .65(1.6) .56(1.2) .92(1.8) 
 
Demographic Analyses 
 The demographic responses from members of all three groups were compared 
using ANOVA and chi-square analyses to determine if there were significant differences 
in their responses (see Tables 3-5).  None of the ANOVA analyses reached a 
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conventional significance level of .05 (age: F (2,143) = .21, p = .81; # of misdemeanors: 
F (2,140) = 1.64, p = .20; # of felonies: F (2,141) = .54, p = .58; # of times in prison: F 
(2,142) = .46, p = .63).  Further, for the categorical variables (race, education level) 
neither of the chi-square analyses reached a traditional level of significance (race: χ2 (1, 
N = 147) = 3.31, p = .51; education: χ2 (1, N = 147) = 2.88, p = .58).  These results 
indicate that the groups formed by the MCLUST procedure did not differ significantly 
from each other on demographic characteristics.  Therefore, any differences that might be 
found among these groups on other variables of interest should not be due to differences 
on these demographic variables. 
Table 3 
 
Demographic Analyses 
 
 Non-Psychopathic Primary Secondary  
Variable M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) F df p 
Age 33.1 (9.6) 32.9 (10.4) 31.7 (9.9) .21 2,143 .81  
# of misdemeanor  
convictions 2.9 (3.2) 4.3 (4.7) 3.2 (3.3) 1.64 2,140 .20  
# of felony  
convictions 3.2 (5.5) 3.5 (3.4) 4.6 (7.5) .54 2,141 .58 
# of times in prison .65 (1.6) .56 (1.2) .92 (1.8) .46 2,142 .63 
________________________________________________________________________
   
 
Table 4 
 
Demographic Analyses (Race) 
 
 White Black Hispanic  
Variable  % % % χ2 
    χ2  = 3.31, p = .51 
   Non-psychopathic 59% 26% 15%  
   Primary  70% 15% 15%  
   Secondary  50% 36% 14%  
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Table 5 
 
Demographic Analyses (Education Level) 
 
   At least 
 < High school High school some college  
Variable  % % % χ2 
    χ2  = 2.88, p = .58 
   Non-psychopathic 52% 32% 16%  
   Primary  52% 37% 11%  
   Secondary  67% 22% 11%  
 
Analyses of Study Hypotheses2 
 Hypothesis 1(a) and 1(b).  Due to the fact that both parts of hypothesis 1 (1(a) and 
1(b)) were tested by a repeated measures ANOVA, their results will both be discussed 
together.  Part 1(a) of hypothesis 1 predicted that when engaging in a passive avoidance 
task, members of the primary psychopath group would commit significantly more passive 
avoidance errors than would either members of the secondary psychopath group or those 
in the non-psychopathic group.  This would serve as a conceptual replication of much of 
the previous work on this topic, as well as setting up the necessary condition to test 
hypothesis 1(b).  Part 1(b) of hypothesis 1 predicted that punishment frequency and 
intensity would act to moderate the number of passive avoidance errors for members of 
the primary psychopath group.  Specifically, at higher levels of intensity and frequency 
of punishment, members of the primary psychopathy group were expected to show 
                                            
2 Using boxplots produced by SPSS’ “explore” function, the data set was checked for the 
presence of outliers.  The resulting boxplots indicated that the data sets used for hypotheses 1 
and 3 did contain outliers.  Consequently, the statistical analyses for these two hypotheses were 
conducted both with and without the outliers present in the data sets.  The resulting analyses 
were not changed by retaining or eliminating the outliers from the analyses (i.e., a non-significant 
result did not change to become significant and vice verse). Therefore, the results presented are 
with outliers retained in the data sets. 
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significantly reduced levels of passive avoidance errors as compared to their own level of 
passive avoidance errors when frequency and intensity of punishment was lower.   
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if there were 
significant differences between groups at either time period, within groups across time, or 
in the interaction between groups across time.  For part 1(a) of hypothesis 1 to receive 
support, the between groups part of this analysis must be significant.  The results from 
this ANOVA showed that there were no differences among the three groups regarding the 
number of passive avoidance errors that were committed during the Go-No-Go or the 
Modified Go-No-Go tasks (F (2,137) = .78, p = .46) (see Table 6 for means and standard 
errors).   
Table 6 
 
Outcomes for Hypothesis 1 
 
 Non-Psychopathic Primary Secondary  
Variable M (SE) M (SE) M (SE)  
Go-No-Go   4.1 (.12) 4.1 (.21) 3.8 (.22)  
 
Modified-Go-No-Go   2.7 (.17) 3 (.3) 2.5 (.31)    
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
To assess the validity of part 1(b) of hypothesis 1, the interaction term of the 
repeated measures ANOVA was also examined.  For part 1(b) to be supported, the 
interaction must be significant.  The interaction between the within factors variable and 
the between subjects variable was not significant (F (2,137) = .55, p = .58).  
Lastly, the multivariate within subjects analysis was also examined.  The results 
showed that there was a significant difference within groups regarding the number of 
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passive avoidance errors committed across the two tasks (Go-No-Go and Modified Go-
No-Go) (F (1,137) = 96.1, p < .01) (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3 
Mean Errors of Commission by Group on Go-No-Go and Modified Go-No-Go Tasks 
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These results indicate that neither part of hypothesis 1 was supported by the data 
collected in this study.  However, there was a significant drop in the commission of 
passive avoidance errors found within all 3 groups across the two tasks. 
 A post hoc repeated measures ANOVA was conducted that combined subject’s 
responses across the two tasks (Go-No-Go and Modified Go-No-Go).  Because the first 4 
trials of the Modified Go-No-Go are identical to the standard trials of the Go-No-Go task, 
the reward contingencies for subjects are the same and these trials can be conceived, for 
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analytic purposes, as an extension of the Go-No-Go task.  Now the second part of the 
within subjects factor consisted of all 3 trials that involved the first incremental increase 
in the severity and frequency of punishment in the Modified Go-No-Go task, and the 
third part of the within subjects factor consisted of all 3 trials that involved the second 
increase in the severity and frequency of punishment in the Modified Go-No-Go task.  
The results from this second ANOVA showed that there were no differences between the 
three groups regarding the number of passive avoidance errors that were committed 
during the any of the three new Go-No-Go task groupings (F (2,137) = .41, p = .66) (see 
Table 7 for means and standard errors).   
Table 7 
 
Re-Analysis of Outcomes for Hypothesis 1 
 
 Non-Psychopathic Primary Secondary  
Variable M (SE) M (SE) M (SE)  
Go-No-Go 4.6 (.14) 4.7 (.25) 4.2 (.26)  
 
Modified-Go-No-Go (first increase in punishment severity and frequency) 
 1.4 (.12) 1.5 (.21) 1 (.21)    
 
Modified-Go-No-Go (second increase in punishment severity and frequency) 
    1.1 (.12) 1.1 (.21) 1.4 (.22)
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 To again assess the validity of part 1(b) of hypothesis 1, the interaction term of 
the repeated measures ANOVA was examined.  This interaction was significant (F 
(4,274) = 4.31, p < .01).  Lastly, the multivariate within subjects’ outcomes were also 
analyzed.  The results showed that there was also a significant difference within groups 
regarding the number of passive avoidance errors committed across the 3 new Go-No-Go 
task groupings (F (2,136) = 466.85, p < .01) (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 
Mean Errors of Commission by Group on Traditional Go-No-Go Trials, Modified Go-
No-Go L1 (First Increase in Intensity and Severity of Punishment) and Modified Go-No-
Go L2 (Second Increase in Intensity and Severity of Punishment)
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Evaluation of hypothesis 1 within-subjects contrasts. Due to the fact that there 
were multiple levels of the within subjects’ factor for this analysis, the specific contrast 
effects can be examined. The results of the repeated measures ANOVA indicate that 
there was an interaction between the within subjects factor and the between groups 
factor.  An examination of the contrasts was therefore necessary to determine the nature 
of the interaction and whether it supported part 1(b) of hypothesis 1.  The contrasts
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showed that the significant group by task interaction occurred only when the errors 
committed between the two modified portions of the Go-No-Go were considered (F (2, 
137) = 8.25, p < .01) (see figure 4).  An examination of the marginal means showed that 
whereas those in the primary and non-psychopathic clusters continued to lower the 
number of passive avoidance errors as the frequency and severity of punishment 
continued to increase, those in the secondary psychopathy cluster actually increased the 
number of errors that they committed from the first increase in punishment to the second 
and most extreme increase in punishment.  While this is an interesting post hoc finding, it 
does not do anything to change the lack of support for part 1(b) of hypothesis 1. 
 Although neither the between groups effects, nor the closer examination of the 
significant interaction effects supported either part of hypothesis 1, there was still found 
to be a significant drop in the commission of passive avoidance errors found within all 3 
groups across the 3 new stages of the tasks.  Further analysis of the within subjects 
contrasts indicated that the significant differences in commission of passive avoidance 
errors was driven by a significant drop in the number of such errors between the regular 
Go-No-Go task and the first increase in punishment severity and frequency (F (1,137) = 
1029.88, p < .01) (see figure 4).  There was no further decrease in the number of errors 
within the groups when they proceeded from the first increase in punishment frequency 
and severity to the second increase in punishment (F (1,137) = 1.21, p = .27).   
 Hypothesis 2.  This hypothesis predicted that those in the primary psychopath 
cluster would exhibit significantly less attitude change following a cognitive dissonance 
induction task, than would those in either the secondary psychopath cluster or the non-
psychopathic cluster.  The test of this hypothesis was conducted using orthogonal 
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planned comparisons utilizing a one-way ANCOVA (with pre-cognitive dissonance 
induction attitudes serving as the covariate).   
 Before proceeding with the ANCOVA, it was important to check for 2 conditions.  
First, it had to be determined that there was no significant interaction between the 
covariate (pre cognitive dissonance induction attitudes) and the independent factor 
(group membership) on post cognitive dissonance induction attitudes.  Analyses 
indicated that there was no such relationship between these two variables (F (2,141) = 
1.11, p = .80).  Second, correlations between the covariate and the dependant variable 
(post cognitive dissonance induction attitudes) were conducted to be sure that they were 
linearly related as required for ANCOVA’s.  The correlation between these two variables 
was significant (r (145) = .58, p < .01).   
 The results of the ensuing ANCOVA analysis showed that there were no 
significant differences in post cognitive dissonance induction attitudes among the 3 
groups (F (2,143) = 2.19, p = .12) (see Table 8).  Although there were no significant 
differences among the 3 groups, the estimated means showed that those in the secondary 
group were the highest (M = 6.8), with the non-psychopathic group in the middle (M = 
6.0) and those in the primary group the lowest (M = 5.6).  Further, responses on the 
freedom to choose manipulation check were explored to determine if differences on this 
measure may explain the results.  As a whole, the sample had a mean of 7.44, which is 
above the midpoint of the scale and represented feelings on the part of participants that 
they felt free to choose the topic that they wrote on.  Further, when assessed by group, 
there were no differences on this measure (F (2, 144) = 1.27, p = .28) [Primary (7.11), 
Secondary (8.25), Non-psychopathic (7.28)].  
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Table 8 
 
Outcomes for Hypothesis 2 
 
 Non-Psychopathic Primary Secondary  
Variable M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) F df p  
Post cognitive 
induction attitudes 6.0 (.23) 5.6 (.42) 6.8 (.41) 2.19 2,143 .12 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   Inspection of the data revealed that 14% of the sample had reported a pre-
dissonance induction attitude that was already at the ceiling of the measure used to assess 
their attitudes.  This situation makes it impossible for any of those 14% to show cognitive 
dissonance since they cannot move any higher on the scale at post test than they had 
already answered at pre-test.  To determine if this problem negatively impacted support 
for this hypothesis, the ANCOVA was run again after excluding this 14% from the 
analyses. 
 As with the earlier analysis, the two important assumptions for ANCOVA’s had 
to be checked.  Analyses indicated that there was no interaction between the covariate 
and the group factor (F (2,120) = .11, p = .89) on post cognitive dissonance induction 
attitudes.  Second, the correlation between the covariate and the dependant variable was 
significant (r (122) = .58, p < .01).   
 The results of the ensuing ANCOVA analysis showed that there were still no 
significant differences in post cognitive induction attitudes among the 3 groups (F 
(2,122) = 1.54, p = .22) (see Table 9).  Again, although there were no significant 
differences between the groups, the estimated means were still in the same order as they 
were for the previous analysis of this hypothesis (secondary group (M = 6.4), non-
psychopathic group (M = 5.7), primary group (M = 5.3)).  Further, responses on the 
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freedom to choose manipulation check were also explored without these 14%.  As a 
whole, the sample now had a mean of 7.36, which is above the midpoint of the scale and 
represented feelings on the part of participants that they felt free to choose the topic that 
they wrote on.  Further, as before, when assessed by group, there were no differences on 
this measure (F (2, 123) = .96, p = .38) [Primary (7.13), Secondary (8.12), Non-
psychopathic (7.18)].  
Table 9 
 
Re-analysis of Outcomes for Hypothesis 2 
 
 Non-Psychopathic Primary Secondary  
Variable M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) F df p  
Post cognitive 
induction attitudes 5.7 (2.5) 5.3 (4.6) 6.4 (4.4) 1.54 2,120 .22 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Hypothesis 3.  This hypothesis predicted that members of the primary psychopath 
cluster would score significantly higher on the LOT-R than would those in the secondary 
psychopath cluster.  This hypothesis was tested using a t-test on the mean LOT-R scores 
for the primary and secondary psychopathy groups.  The results of this analysis indicate 
that there was no difference between the two groups on their levels of optimism (t (53) = 
-.47, p = .64) (see Table 10).    
Table 10 
 
Outcomes for Hypothesis 3 
 
 Primary Secondary  
Variable M (SD) M (SD) t df p  
LOT-R 19.2 (4.8) 19.8 (4) -.47 53 .64 
________________________________________________________________________    
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 Hypothesis 4.  This hypothesis predicted that optimism, as measured on the LOT-
R, would mediate the relationship between primary psychopathy scores and the number 
of errors of commission made on a card playing passive avoidance task.  Because testing 
this hypothesis involved a variable-level rather than a person-level analysis, participants 
were no longer grouped according to the MCLUST solutions.  To determine if this 
hypothesis was supported, it would first have to have been shown that scores on the 
primary psychopathy subscale of the SRPS, optimism and the number of errors of 
commission were all significantly correlated with each other.  Only if this condition was 
met, would it be proper to move onto the next step of using regression equations to test 
for mediation.   
Results showed that the LOT-R was significantly correlated with scores on the 
primary psychopathy subscale of the SRPS (r (147) = -.21, p < .01).  This negative 
association was contrary to what had been expected (i.e., a positive, not a negative 
correlation between the LOT-R and the primary subscale of the SRPS was predicted).  
Further analyses also showed that the LOT-R was not correlated with the number of 
errors committed on the card playing task (r (147) = .05, p = .26), nor were scores on the 
SRPS primary subscale correlated with the number of errors on the card playing task (r 
(147) = -.02, p = .39) (see Table 11).  Due to the fact that the first condition for testing 
hypothesis 4 was not met (i.e., that all three variables be significantly related to each 
other) there was no need to continue further by assessing the potential mediating effects 
of optimism with regression analyses.  The failure to find significant correlations 
between the three variables indicates that hypothesis 4 was not supported in this study.   
 
 
 
 
 Table 11 
 
Correlation Outcomes for Hypothesis 4 
________________________________________________________________________ 
  SRPS Primary scale # of cards played 
LOT-R  -.21* .05 
SRPS Primary scale   -.02 
* p <.01.    N = 147. 
 
Re-Formulation of Groups Using Newman’s Method 
 As mentioned earlier, the initial MCLUST analyses did not provide a usable 3 
group solution (i.e., primary, secondary and non-psychopathic) to test the study 
hypotheses.  The previous analyses were conducted after clustering only those scoring 
high on the measure of psychopathy, which yielded primary and secondary psychopathy 
groups whose cluster variable profiles only partially matched theoretical expectations.  
Thus, the original back-up strategy of following Newman’s methods for partitioning 
individuals into one of the three experimental groups was also followed to determine if 
different outcomes would be found in regards to testing the hypotheses.  The following 
analyses mirrored those previously conducted and detailed for the groups produced by 
the MCLUST solution. 
Participant Characteristics 
 Table 12 details the demographic characteristics for the total sample as well as for 
the two psychopathic and one non-psychopathic group formed using the methods of 
Newman and colleagues. 
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Table 12 
 
Participant Characteristics (Newman’s Method) 
 
 Total Non-Psychopathic Primary Secondary 
 (N=150) (N=93) (N=17) (N=40) 
Age (years)  
  Mean (SD) 32.8(9.6) 33.1(9.6) 32.9(10.3) 32.1(10.1)  
Race/Ethnicity 
  White  59% 59% 63% 59% 
  Black 26% 26% 25% 26% 
  Hispanic 15% 15% 12% 15% 
Education 
  < high school  55% 52% 63% 59% 
  If < high school,  
  have GED? (%yes) 51% 50% 73% 42% 
High school diploma 31% 32% 31% 28% 
  At least some  
  college 14% 16% 6% 13% 
Criminal history 
  % convicted of  
  past misdemeanors 83% 80% 88% 87% 
  # of misdemeanor 
  convictions  
        Mean (SD) 3.2(3.5) 2.9(3.1) 4.5 (5.5) 3.4 (3.3) 
  % convicted of 
  past felonies 82%  80% 81% 87% 
  # of felony  
  convictions 
        Mean (SD) 3.5(5.6) 3.3(5.5) 5.4 (7.8) 3.4 (4.9) 
  % sent to prison  
  for a past crime 29% 26% 44% 28% 
  # times in prison 
        Mean (SD) .68(1.5) .66 (1.6) 1.1 (1.7) .62 (1.4) 
 
Demographic Analyses 
 The demographic responses from members of all three groups were compared 
using ANOVA and chi-square analyses to determine if there were significant differences 
in their responses (see tables 13-15).  None of the ANOVA analyses were significant at 
the .05 level (age: F (2,143) = .15, p = .87; # of misdemeanors: F (2,140) = 1.55, p = .22; 
# of felonies: F (2,141) = 1.0, p = .4; # of times in prison: F (2,142) = .54, p = .59).  Chi-
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square analyses for the categorical variables (race, education level) also did not reach a 
.05 level of significance (race: χ2 (4, N = 147) = .11, p = .99; education: χ2 (4, N = 147) = 
1.55, p = .82).  These results indicate that the groups formed according to Newman’s 
methods did not differ significantly from each other on demographic characteristics.  
Therefore, any differences that might be found among these groups on other variables of 
interest should not be due to differences on these demographic variables. 
Table 13 
 
Demographic Analyses (Newman’s Method) 
 
 Non-Psychopathic Primary Secondary  
Variable M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) F df p 
Age 33.1 (9.5) 32.9 (10.3) 32.1 (10.1) .15 2,143 .87  
# of misdemeanor  
convictions 2.9 (3.1) 4.5 (5.5) 3.4 (3.3) 1.6 2,140 .22  
# of felony  
convictions 3.3 (5.5) 5.4 (7.8) 3.4 (4.9) .97 2,141 .38 
# of times in prison .66 (1.6) 1.1 (1.7) .62 (1.4) .54 2,142 .59 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Table 14 
 
Demographic Analyses (Race) (Newman’s Method) 
 
 White Black Hispanic  
Variable  % % % χ2  
    χ2  = .11, p = .99 
   Non-psychopathic 59% 26% 15%  
   Primary  63% 25% 12%  
   Secondary  59% 26% 15%  
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Table 15 
 
Demographic Analyses (Education Level) (Newman’s Method) 
 
   At least 
 < High school High school some college  
Variable  % % % χ2 
    χ2  = 1.55, p = .82 
   Non-psychopathic 52% 32% 16%  
   Primary  63% 31% 6%  
   Secondary  59% 28% 13%  
 
Analyses of Study Hypotheses3 
 Hypothesis 1(a) and 1(b).  Parts 1(a) and 1(b) of the first hypothesis will again be 
discussed together.  Again, for part 1(a) of hypothesis 1 to receive support, the between 
groups part of a repeated measures ANOVA must be significant.  As with the analyses of 
the MCLUST groups, the results from this ANOVA showed that there were no 
differences among the three groups regarding the number of passive avoidance errors that 
were committed during the Go-No-Go or the Modified Go-No-Go tasks (F (2,135) = .30, 
p = .74) (see Table 16 for means and standard errors).  For part 1(b) to be supported, the 
interaction term of the repeated measures ANOVA must be significant.  The interaction 
between the within factors variable and the between subjects variable was not significant 
(F (2,135) = .59, p = .55).   Lastly, the multivariate within subjects analysis was also 
examined.  The results showed that there was a significant difference within groups 
regarding the number of passive avoidance errors committed across the two tasks (Go-
                                            
3 As with the MCLUST analyses, using boxplots produced by SPSS’ “explore” function, the data 
set was checked for the presence of outliers.  The resulting boxplots indicated that the data sets 
used for hypotheses 1 and 3 did contain outliers.  Consequently, the statistical analyses for these 
two hypotheses were conducted both with and without the outliers present in the data sets.  The 
resulting analyses were not changed by retaining or eliminating the outliers from the analyses 
(i.e., a non-significant result did not change to become significant and vice verse). Therefore, the 
results presented are with outliers retained in the data sets. 
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No-Go and Modified Go-No-Go) (F (1,135) = 98.48, p < .01) (see Figure 5).  As was the 
case with the groups as formed by the MCLUST procedure, these results indicate that 
neither part of hypothesis 1 was supported.  However, there was again a significant drop 
in the commission of passive avoidance errors found within all 3 groups across the two 
tasks. 
 
Table 16 
 
Outcomes for Hypothesis 1 (Newman’s Method) 
 
 Non-Psychopathic Primary Secondary  
Variable M (SE) M (SE) M (SE)  
Go-No-Go   4.2 (.12) 3.9 (.28) 4 (.18)  
 
Modified-Go-No-Go   2.7 (.17) 2.5 (.38) 2.8 (.26)    
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 5 
Mean Errors of Commission by Group on Go-No-Go and Modified Go-No-Go Tasks for 
Groups Created Through Newman’s Method 
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 A post hoc repeated measures ANOVA was again conducted using the combined 
subject’ responses across the two tasks (Go-No-Go and Modified Go-No-Go) to produce 
three levels of analysis for the Go-No-Go task.  The results from this ANOVA again 
showed that there were no differences between the three groups regarding the number of 
passive avoidance errors that were committed during the any of the three newly formed 
Go-No-Go task groupings (F (2,134) = .18, p = .84) (see Table 17 for means and standard 
errors).   
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Table 17 
 
Re-analysis of Outcomes for Hypothesis 1 (Newman’s Method) 
 
 Non-Psychopathic Primary Secondary  
Variable M (SE) M (SE) M (SE)  
Go-No-Go 4.6 (.14) 4.3 (.38) 4.4 (.22)  
 
Modified-Go-No-Go (first increase in punishment severity and frequency) 
 1.4 (.12) 1.2 (.27) 1.2 (.18)    
 
Modified-Go-No-Go (second increase in punishment severity and frequency) 
    1.1 (.11) 1.1 (.25) 1.2 (.17)    
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 To assess part 1(b) of hypothesis 1 with this altered configuration of the Go-No-
Go task, the interaction term of the repeated measures ANOVA was examined.  This 
interaction was not significant (F (4,268) = .63, p = .62).  Lastly, the multivariate within 
subjects’ outcomes were also analyzed.  The results showed that there was a significant 
difference within groups regarding the number of passive avoidance errors committed 
across the 3 new Go-No-Go task groupings (F (2,133) = 414.02, p < .01) (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6 
Mean Errors of Commission by Group on Traditional Go-No-Go Trials, Modified Go-
No-Go L1 (First Increase in Intensity and Severity of Punishment) and Modified Go-No-
Go L2 (Second Increase in Intensity and Severity of Punishment) for Groups Created 
Through Newman’s Method 
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 Evaluation of hypothesis 1 within-subjects contrasts.  With the groups formed by 
the MCLUST procedure, an interaction was present, which upon examination was found 
to indicate that those in the secondary psychopathy group increased their levels of 
responding (i.e., committed more passive avoidance errors) in the final stage of the task 
when they were being most frequently and intensely punished for responding incorrectly.  
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No such interaction between group and level of the task was found for the groups as 
formed through Newman’s method. 
 Although neither part of hypothesis 1 was supported, as with the previous 
analyses using the MCLUST groupings, those in the primary group still showed a 
significant drop in the commission of passive avoidance errors across the new 3 stages of 
the Go-No-Go tasks.  This significant reduction in the commission of passive avoidance 
errors was again driven by a significant drop in the number of such errors between the 
regular Go-No-Go task and the first increase in punishment severity and frequency (F 
(1,134) = 731.40, p < .01) (see Figure 6).  There was no further decrease in the number of 
errors within the groups when they proceeded from the first increase in punishment 
frequency and severity to the second increase in punishment (F (1,134) = 2.71, p = .10) 
(see Figure 6).   
 Hypothesis 2.  This hypothesis predicted that those in the primary psychopath 
cluster would exhibit significantly less attitude change following a cognitive dissonance 
induction task, than would those in either the secondary psychopath cluster or the non-
psychopathic cluster.  The test of this hypothesis was again conducted using orthogonal 
planned comparisons utilizing a one-way ANCOVA (with pre-cognitive dissonance 
induction attitudes serving as the covariate).   
 As with the previous ANCOVA analysis, 2 important conditions were necessary 
to confirm.  Analyses indicated that there was no interaction between the covariate and 
the independent factor (F (2,141) = .06, p = .94).  Second, correlations between the 
covariate and the dependant variable (post cognitive dissonance induction attitudes) were 
conducted to ensure that they were linearly related as required for ANCOVA’s.  The 
correlation between these two variables was significant (r (145) = .58, p < .01).  The 
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resulting ANCOVA showed that there were no significant differences in post cognitive 
dissonance induction attitudes among the 3 groups (F (2,143) = .20, p = .82) (see Table 
18).  The responses on the freedom to choose manipulation check were again explored.  
As before, the sample mean was still 7.44 since this does not split groups in any way.  
Again, this shows that participants felt free to choose the topic that they wrote on.  There 
were no differences on this measure (F (2, 144) = .42, p = .66) [Primary (8.00), 
Secondary (7.56), Non-psychopathic (7.28)] when participants were assigned to groups 
by Newman’s method.  
Table 18 
 
Outcomes for Hypothesis 2 (Newman’s Method) 
 
 Non-Psychopathic Primary Secondary  
Variable M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) F df p  
Post cognitive 
induction attitudes 6.1 (.23) 6.0 (.56) 6.3 (.36) .20 2,143 .82 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 As with the previous MCLUST groupings, to determine if the 14% of the 
participants who were at the ceiling of the attitude measure at time 1 negatively impacted 
support for this hypothesis, the ANCOVA was run again after excluding this 14% from 
the analyses.  As with the earlier analysis, the two important assumptions for ANCOVA’s 
had to be checked.  Analyses indicated that there was no interaction between the 
covariate and the group factor (F (2,120) = .11, p = .89) on post cognitive dissonance 
induction attitudes.  Second, the correlation between the covariate and the dependant 
variable was significant (r (122) = .58, p < .01).  The results of the ensuing ANCOVA 
analysis again showed that there were still no significant differences in post cognitive 
induction attitudes among the 3 groups (F(2,122) = .26, p = .77) (see Table 19).  The 
  76
responses on the freedom to choose manipulation check were again explored without 
these 14%.  As before, without this 14%, the whole sample now had a mean of 7.36, 
which represents that participants felt free to choose the topic that they wrote on.  
Further, as before, when assessed by group, there were no differences on this measure (F 
(2, 123) = .34, p = .71) [Primary (7.71), Secondary (7.62), Non-psychopathic (7.18)].  
Table 19 
 
Re-analysis of Outcomes for Hypothesis 2 (Newman’s Method) 
 
 Non-Psychopathic Primary Secondary  
Variable M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) F df p  
Post cognitive 
induction attitudes 5.7 (.25) 5.5 (.59) 6.0 (.38) .26 2,122 .77 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Hypothesis 3.  This hypothesis predicted that members of the primary psychopath 
cluster would score significantly higher on the LOT-R than would those in the secondary 
psychopath cluster.  Unlike the results with the MCLUST groupings, the results of this 
analysis indicated that there was a significant difference between the two groups on their 
levels of optimism (t (45) = 2.86, p < .01) (see Table 20).  Inspection of the group means 
confirmed the hypothesis that those in the primary psychopathy group showed more 
optimism (M = 21.9), than did those in the secondary group (M = 19.1).  [While this does 
support the hypothesis, it is not surprising that when groups are created by utilizing 
differing levels of anxiety (i.e., high vs. low) as a grouping factor, that they would then 
also be significantly different on their levels of optimism.  This is due to the fact that 
research (Campbell & Kwon, 2001; Lewis & Kliewer, 1995; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 
1994) has previously shown that optimism is significantly and negatively correlated to 
anxiety (i.e., those high on anxiety like secondary psychopaths would also likely be low 
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on optimism and vice verse for primary psychopaths).]  Because of the relationship 
between optimism and anxiety, a post hoc ANCOVA was conducted with anxiety as the 
covariate to determine if the primary and secondary groups differed on optimism when 
anxiety is controlled for.  Prior to conducting the ANCOVA, it was determined that the 
covariate (anxiety) was indeed correlated with the dependent variable (optimism) (r (55) 
= -.25, p < .05).  The results indicated that there was no longer a difference between the 
groups after anxiety was controlled for (F (1, 52) = .02, p = .89). 
Table 20 
 
Outcomes for Hypothesis 3 (Newman’s Method) 
 
 Primary Secondary  
Variable M (SD) M (SD) t df p  
LOT-R 21.9 (2.3) 19.1 (4.6) 2.86 45 .01 
 
 Hypothesis 4.  Because the analysis of this hypothesis was to be conducted with 
regressions and did not rely on participants being partitioned into groups, the outcome for 
this analysis would be no different from the previous analysis of hypothesis 4.     
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Discussion 
General Discussion of Results  
The present study was designed to investigate issues regarding the psychopathy 
construct that are as of yet still poorly understood.  There are practical necessities in 
better understanding this construct due to the great degree of trouble that individuals with 
high degrees of psychopathy can cause society.  Understanding what makes highly 
psychopathic individuals as they are may help society better deal with them once they are 
identified.  Hopefully understanding the etiology of the problem may lead to the 
development of interventions to keep people from ever becoming highly psychopathic in 
the first place.  For example, following from previous research and theorizing by Lykken 
(1995) it would be expected that many individuals with a fearless temperament are at 
higher risk to develop psychopathic traits than are those who have more normal levels of 
fearfulness.  Understanding this etiological link to developing higher levels of 
psychopathy led Lykken (1995) to theorize that the type of parenting that a relatively 
fearless child gets will have an influence on whether that child can be successfully 
socialized.  Therefore, through attempting to understand the etiology of the construct as 
Lykken did, it may be possible to propose ways to attempt to disrupt the course of 
fearless youths towards developing psychopathic traits and antisocial behaviors. 
The current study attempted to add to the research base regarding the construct of 
psychopathy in two ways.  First, it sought empirical confirmation of various patterns of 
personality traits suggested by theory to identify different types of psychopathic 
individuals.  This was accomplished by clustering the participants into discrete groups 
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using various trait measures (i.e., anxiety, fearfulness, behavioral inhibition and 
activation, etc.) that have previously been hypothesized to help distinguish between 
primary and secondary psychopaths and comparing the emergent profiles to the 
theoretical ones. 
Second, this study tested four hypotheses that were designed to expand the base 
of knowledge regarding the psychopath construct by exploring a number of situations in 
which subtypes of psychopaths were expected to show different responses to 
experimental manipulations.  Theoretical subtypes were expected to differ in terms of (1) 
number of passive avoidance errors and (2) responses to increases in frequency and 
intensity of punishment on a passive avoidance task, (3) perseverance on a card playing 
task, and (4) attitudinal change in response to a cognitive dissonance task.  Further, the 
role of a previously untested construct (positive expectancies) in regards to subtyping 
psychopaths was also explored.   
Regarding the empirical confirmation of theoretical subtypes, there was only 
partial correspondence between the group profiles that emerged through MCLUST and 
those suggested by prior theory regarding the psychopathy construct.  Whereas prior 
theorizing by Lykken (1995) and Fowles (1980) posit that clustering a sample of 
offenders on measures of psychopathy, fearlessness, and behavioral inhibition and 
activation should lead to distinct groupings of psychopathic individuals (i.e., primary, 
secondary and non-psychopathic), in this study, it was only when the most psychopathic 
individuals (those who were .5 standard deviations above the mean on the SRPS) were 
separated from the larger group and then clustered on psychopathy and fearlessness that 
usable groups emerged.  Even so, when Z-scores were plotted for these groups on the 
hold out variables (i.e., bis, bas, anxiety) the profiles only weakly fit prior theory as to the 
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mean strength of each group on these traits relative to the other groups.  This lead to 
testing the study hypotheses using both these imperfect groupings produced using 
MCLUST and secondly, using alternative groupings created through using Newman’s 
more traditional method based on elevated psychopathy scores and a median split on a 
measure of anxiety.    
Regardless of the method used to parse the sample into putative psychopathic 
sub-groups, in general the results were unsupportive of the hypotheses examined (unless 
specifically stated, the following comments will pertain to the results from both 
methods). 
Hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b) proposed that compared to the other experimental 
groups, primary psychopaths would commit a significantly higher number of passive 
avoidance errors on a successive Go-No-Go task, and that this difference in commission 
of errors by the primary group could be eliminated by increasing the frequency and 
intensity of punishment given during the task.  This state of affairs did not occur exactly 
as hypothesized a priori.   
Although it was found that primary psychopaths were indeed responsive to 
increases in punishment frequency and intensity across the Go-No-Go and modified Go-
No-Go tasks, there were no differences among the experimental groups in terms of the 
number of errors of commission (passive avoidance errors) during the Go-No-Go part of 
the task (which violates an assumption of part 1a of the hypothesis).  This finding of no 
difference between groups in terms of passive avoidance errors on the Go-No-Go task is 
contrary to the majority of the previous work on this topic (Arnet, Howland, Smith, & 
Newman, 1993; Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman et al., 1990; Patterson, Kosson & 
Newman, 1987), although this is not the only study to find such a result (Howard, 
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Payamal & Neo, 1997) and it is unknown how many other null findings may never have 
been published.  Further, the finding in the present study that rates of responding by those 
in the primary psychopathy group were reduced in response to increases in punishment 
frequency and intensity is consistent with findings previously reported by Blair et al. 
(2004). 
Even though the responses given by those in the primary group on the standard 
version of the Go-No-Go did not turn out as predicted, the fact that primary psychopaths 
were responsive to changes that occurred as they progressed into the modified Go-No-Go 
part of the task suggests that they are indeed capable of noticing changes in the demands 
of a task even after a response set consisting of a high responding has been previously 
set.  Further, as part of one of the other study hypotheses, perseveration on a card-playing 
task was also explored.  On this task, there were also no differences among groups on 
how far through a deck of cards participants would play regardless of the change in 
payoffs that occurred as participants played further through the deck.  This too is contrary 
to what others have previously found (Newman, Patterson & Kosson, 1987) and indicates 
that primary psychopaths, as identified in the two methods in the present study, may not 
differ from controls and secondary psychopaths in their ability to notice changing 
contingencies.   
These findings relating to passive avoidance and perseveration in psychopaths, 
are contrary to the response modulation hypothesis as proposed by Newman and 
colleagues (Lorenz & Newman, 2002; Newman, Patterson & Kosson, 1987; Newman, 
Widom & Nathan, 1985).  The response modulation hypothesis states that low anxious 
(i.e., primary) psychopaths are unable to notice changing payoffs in reward/punishment 
and perseveration tasks due to a deficiency in their ability to perform brief and automatic 
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shifts in attention.  These shifts in attention would allow them to monitor cues peripheral 
to their current tasks that would inform them to change their current dominant response 
set (Lorenz & Newman, 2002; Newman, Patterson & Kosson, 1987; Newman, Widom & 
Nathan, 1985).   
The present finding suggests a number of possibilities regarding the response 
modulation hypothesis of Newman and colleagues.  First, it may be that they are 
completely incorrect in their thinking as to why primary psychopaths commit more 
passive avoidance errors than do secondary or non-psychopaths.  However, based on the 
large amount of empirical support that they have developed so far, it seems more likely 
that they are instead partially correct in their hypothesis.  As stated in the introduction for 
this study, there was a need to further test the responses of psychopathic individuals in a 
broader range of contexts than had previously been done.  In doing so in this study, it 
may have been shown that the response modulation hypothesis is no longer supported 
when peripheral cues to a task are of sufficient strength or frequency.  Therefore, this 
study’s results put into question the degree to which primary psychopaths have difficulty 
in learning reward/punishment based contingencies as well as whether these same 
individuals really do suffer from an inability to automatically shift focus from a dominant 
task as the response modulation hypothesis from Newman and colleagues would contend. 
The second hypothesis predicted that primary psychopaths would not show as 
much attitude change as those in the other two groups after a cognitive dissonance 
induction procedure.  This was predicted due to previous literature that indicated that 
psychopaths, especially those with primary psychopathic features, are less 
physiologically responsive (i.e., decreased levels of arousal, emotional responses) to 
negatively laden stimuli (Patrick, 1994; Patrick, Bradley & Lang, 1993).  If this is true, 
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then attitude change due to the effects of cognitive dissonance (which has been shown to 
be produced most strongly by negatively laden arousal (Losch & Cacioppo, 1990)) 
should not occur in this group, or at least should be quite deficient in comparison to the 
other groups.  The results to the ANCOVA analyses showed that there was no difference 
in the degree of attitude change across the three groups.  This was true even though the 
secondary and non-psychopathy groups showed significant time 1-time 2 changes in 
attitudes whereas those in the primary group showed no significant change across time.   
A further examination of the results showed that even though there was no 
significant degree of attitude change for the primary group, there was still movement in 
attitudes from time 1 to time 2, which evidently was enough to keep the attitudes between 
groups from being significantly different from each other at time 2.  An examination of 
the effect sizes of the primary and secondary psychopathy groups revealed that the 
secondary group had a larger effect size (MCLUST method (.51); Newman’s method 
(.40)) that turned out to be approximately twice the size of that from the primary group 
(MCLUST method (.16); Newman’s method (.21)).  This indicates that the primary group 
was much less responsive to the manipulation than were those in the secondary group.  
However, since the primary group’s effect size was not zero, this also indicates that those 
in this group did have some response to the task and that this should serve as support for 
the notion that they are partly deficient rather than being completely devoid of the ability 
to produce arousal to negatively affective stimuli.   
The third hypothesis was designed to explore the potential of a construct new to 
psychopathy research to help explain differences in the behavior of primary and 
secondary psychopaths.  A wealth of previous research revealed that associations with 
positive (or negative) expectancies (or optimism as specifically used in this study) 
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parallel those with primary and secondary psychopathy across a wide variety of criterion 
variables; this research suggests that primary psychopaths should hold optimistic 
attitudes, whereas secondary psychopaths should hold pessimistic attitudes (see 
appendices A and B for citations).  When this hypothesis was tested however, it was 
found that those in the primary group were not only not more optimistic than those in the 
secondary group as was predicted, but were also less optimistic than those in the non-
psychopathic cluster.   
To attempt to clarify what scores on the LOT-R may mean, it has been proposed 
that the scale can be divided into two subscales (one purported to measure only optimism 
and the other to measure only pessimism) (Chang, Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1997).  
When the groups derived using MCLUST and Newman’s method were compared on 
these separate subscales, it was found that (as with the LOT-R total scores) primary and 
secondary psychopaths did not statistically differ from each other on either the optimism 
or pessimism subscales of the LOT-R.  However, when all psychopathic individuals were 
combined together into one group, it was found that they did differ from the non-
psychopathic group in terms of having statistically higher scores on the pessimism 
subscale.  This seems to indicate that compared to non-psychopathic individuals, that 
psychopaths have an equivalent ability to feel optimistic about life situations, but tend to 
be more amenable to pessimism when the opportunity arises as well. 
The final hypothesis predicted that primary psychopaths would persist further 
through a deck of cards than would other groups and that this behavior would be 
mediated by high optimism.  Those in the primary psychopathy group did not on average 
play further through the deck of cards than those in the other groups, nor (as was just 
mentioned above) were they more optimistic on average than those in the other two 
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groups.  A comparison of results from a previous card playing study using a highly 
comparable paradigm (Newman, Patterson & Kosson, 1987) shows that the mean number 
of cards played by those in the non-psychopathic groups is comparable across studies (68 
cards played in the current study and 63 cards played in the comparison study).  
However, the average number of cards which were played by those in the psychopathy 
groups was much lower in the current study as compared to the previous study by 
Newman et al.  In the current study, those in the primary group played an average of 65 
cards and those in the secondary group played an average of 60 cards (total when the two 
groups were combined into one group was 62).  Newman et al. (1987), did not separate 
his psychopathic participants into subtype groups and as such, he found that his 
psychopathic group played an average of 90 out of the 100 cards in the deck before 
stopping.  This is clearly much higher than the average 62 cards that were played in the 
present study when combining the two psychopathic groups into one group.  Therefore, 
the results from this study indicate that non-psychopaths were declining to continue 
through the deck of cards at a very similar point in both studies, yet the psychopathic 
individuals in the present study were declining to continue at a point much earlier than in 
the previous work by Newman et al. (1987).     
Study Limitations 
The present study has limitations that may have hindered the hypotheses being 
adequately supported.  Because one of the interests of this research was to replicate a 
previous study that had examined rewards/punishments and Go-No-Go tasks, it was 
decided to use the same self-report measure of psychopathy that had been previously 
used in that study (Brinkley, Schmitt, Smith & Newman (2001); Lynam, Whiteside and 
Jones (1999)).  The decision to use the same self-report measure was made in order to 
  86
hold steady what otherwise would have been a major source of variation between the 
studies when trying to compare their results.  However, a limitation of using the same 
self-report measure (the SRPS) is that the SRPS may have some difficulty in discerning 
between primary and secondary types of psychopaths (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006).  In 
two studies, it has been found that the SRPS factor which purports to assess primary 
psychopathic characteristics relates highly to scales on other measures which assess 
secondary psychopathic characteristics.  Sometimes the SRPS primary scale even relates 
to these other secondary scales more highly than with the primary scales of the same 
measures (i.e., with the two scales of the PPI for instance) (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006).  
For instance, Lilienfeld, Skeem, and Poythress (2004) found that the primary subscale of 
the SRPS was correlated at .62 with PPI-II, which is associated with secondary features, 
and only .16 with PPI-I, which is associated with primary psychopathy features.  Further, 
Brinkley et al., 2001, found that the primary scale of the SRPS was correlated as strongly 
(.31) with factor 2 of the PCL-R as with factor 1 (.30).  This cross contamination of 
secondary psychopathic features in the SRPS’s primary scale makes it harder to correctly 
divide groups into relatively ”pure” primary and secondary groups and could limit the 
ability to find differences between the groups on dependent variables. 
A second limitation is that the participants for this study come from a group that 
resides at a residential drug treatment program rather than a prison as is the case for most 
of the prior research conducted with psychopaths and especially in regards to 
psychopaths and their performance on passive avoidance and perseveration tasks.  While 
it is true that a great majority of the participants in this study have been arrested in the 
past (123 of the participants have been arrested for committing past felony crimes) and 
29% have spent at least some time in prison.  It is then also true that 71% have never 
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been sent to prison for their past criminal behaviors.  Therefore, even though it is 
possible to be quite psychopathic yet manage to avoid being sent to prison, it is also 
likely that the individuals in this study (mostly individuals who have never been to 
prison) were not as psychopathic (at least on the secondary scale) as those in prior 
studies.  If this is true, then the responses on the passive avoidance and perseveration 
tasks would not be expected to be as persistent as would be predicted based on a 
literature which heavily depends on the outcomes from more psychopathic individuals.  
Another limitation is that since the construct of positive expectancy had not yet 
been explored in relation to psychopathy, it is entirely possible that optimism was not the 
ideal way to conceptualize positive expectancies as they relate to psychopathy and its 
subtypes.  It may be the case that another measure of the positive expectancy construct 
(i.e., hope) would have been more effective in showing the theorized relations.   
Another limitation is that the monetary incentive provided for the participants to 
play the Go-No-Go, modified Go-No-Go, and card playing tasks was minimal and not 
guaranteed.  Prior to completing the tasks, participants were notified that a single award 
of $20 would be given to the one participant who attained the highest combined scores 
across the tasks.  Because the monetary incentive was small, distant and not guaranteed, 
it is possible that participants were only minimally engaged in performing the tasks.  This 
is problematic because without being properly engaged in the tasks, the differences 
between the primary psychopaths and the non-psychopaths are less explainable as a 
failure of Newman’s response modulation theory. This is because this theory contends 
that it is a lack of an ability to momentarily disengage attention from a task to see 
changing contingencies that differs between primary psychopaths and others.  If the 
primary psychopaths were never really engaged in the task in the first place, then it is not 
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unexpected that they could see the changing contingencies and perform just as well as 
those from the other groups, which is what the results showed.   
Still regarding the passive avoidance and perseveration tasks, it is not known to 
what degree the participants discussed these tasks among themselves and may have 
provided strategies (either willingly or unwittingly) to future participants that helped 
them perform better than they may otherwise have done.  This especially pertains to the 
card playing task in which the average number of cards played for all three groups were 
quite similar in regards to the point at which they stopped playing through the deck of 
cards.  This is again contrary to Newman’s research, which has found that primary 
psychopathic individuals played much further than those in the other two groups.  It 
could be that those who might otherwise have played further through the deck if they 
were naïve to the procedure (i.e., those in the primary group) heard about a winning 
strategy (i.e., only play about half of the cards) and performed better because of this. 
Lastly, resource limitations precluded the use of the PCL-R as the measure of 
psychopathy and contemporaneous recording of physiological responses from the 
participants to the tasks that they took part in.  Utilizing physiological measures (such as 
skin conductance levels, or cardiac impedance) would have been helpful in determining if 
there were differences in physiological reactivity between groups when they were 
engaged in the cognitive dissonance task as well as when they were responding to the 
stimuli on the Go-No-Go style tasks and the card playing task.  It may be the case that 
physiological differences would be significant where differences on self-report measures 
or game playing tasks were not.     
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Future Directions for Psychopathy Research 
First, it seems desirable to continue to conduct research on psychopathy self-
report measures to facilitate greater study of the construct.  Even though the PCL-R is 
often considered the measure of choice to best assess psychopathy in offender 
populations, its undeniable time and resource intensive nature makes it difficult for all 
researchers to use.  Expending more effort to perfect self-report measures (such as the 
new PPI-R by Lilienfeld, (2005) may help the field move towards being able to more 
precisely assess psychopathy and its subtypes.  The development of valid self-report 
psychopathy measures may allow research to move more easily into many situations that 
couldn’t be explored before due to time constraints, or limited access to appropriate 
records. 
Second, regarding expanding the subject base on which psychopathy research has 
traditional been conducted, recent research indicates that psychopathy is more likely a 
dimensional construct rather than a taxonic one (Marcus, John & Edens, 2004; Edens, 
Markus, Lilienfeld & Poythress, 2006).  Thus, it seems appropriate to conduct more 
research using participants from populations which are not incarcerated in prisons and 
other non-offender samples.  To conduct research with populations in less “locked down” 
criminal offender facilities and even the general public at large would inform the field 
regarding how individuals with differing levels of psychopathy behave.  For example, it 
would be beneficial to understand how the somewhat psychopathic, yet successful 
individual behaves relative to a more criminally involved psychopaths and what 
underlying aspects of psychopathy makes them different. 
Lastly, with the wealth of psychophysiological methods available today, it is 
surprising that the majority of work isn’t being done on this construct with such 
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measures.  This is especially true given the importance that contemporary theories of the 
construct place on a biological root.  For example, Newman’s position that anxiety has a 
strong role in differentiating between types of psychopaths could be tested by drug 
blockade studies or any paradigm that assesses activity of the sympathetic nervous 
system (chiefly through using cardiac impedance to determine preejection period (PEP) 
in response to arousing events).  Further, if Newman is correct in his response 
modulation theory, that psychopaths get so focused on tasks that they can’t shift attention 
to notice peripheral cues regarding changing rates of payoffs, then perhaps some sort of 
acoustic oddball task could be set up to test that theory in a psychophysiological manner. 
Overall, the results from this study did not support the hypotheses as stated a 
priori.  However, these negative findings do not provide sufficient basis for discarding 
the hypotheses because of concerns about the specific measures used in this study.  It 
may still be fruitful to test these hypotheses using other, better validated measures of 
psychopathy or other key constructs (e.g. hope versus optimism) as suggested herein.  
Further exploration along these lines may result in new knowledge about the potential for 
primary psychopaths to change their goal driven behavior in response to changing 
contingencies and to the nature of the relationship between positive expectancies and 
psychopathy subtypes.  These findings are important because only through such 
continued exploration of the construct can psychopathy be understood to the point where 
society may be able to manage the behaviors of these troubling individuals.  
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Appendix A 
Relation to high optimism Variable Relation to Primary Psychopathy 
Negative correlation 
 
Cites: Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 
1994; Lewis & Kliewer, 1995; 
Raikkonenet al., 1999; Campbell & 
Kwon, 2001; Kwon, 2002. 
Anxiety Negative correlation 
 
Cites: Harpur et al., 1989; Hare, 
1991; Patrick, 1994; Smith & 
Newman, 1990; Verona et al., 2001. 
Negative correlation 
 
Cites: Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 
1994; Mascaro, Rosen & Morey, 2004. 
Neuroticism Negative correlation 
 
Cites: Harpur et al., 1989; Hare, 
1991; Widiger & Lynam, 1998; 
Verona et al., 2001; Miller et al., 
2001. 
Negative correlation 
 
Cites: Kashani et al., 1997; Lucas, 
Diener & Suh, 1996; Raikkonen et al., 
1999; Chang & Sanna, 2001. 
Negative Affect Negative correlation 
 
Cites: Patrick, 1994; Verona et al., 
2001; Benning et al., 2003; Patrick 
et al., 2003. 
Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Hickman, Watson & Morris, 
1996. 
Narcissism Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Harpur et al., 1989; Reiss, 
Grubin & Meux, 1999; McHoskey, 
Werzel & Szyaro, 1998. 
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Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Kashani et al., 1997; Lucas, 
Diener & Suh, 1996; Raikkonen et al., 
1999; Chang & Sanna, 2001. 
Positive Affect Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Patrick, 1994. 
Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Currey, Snyder et al., 1997; 
Snyder, Hoza et al., 1997; Snyder, 
Michael & Cheavens, 1999. 
Success/ 
Achievement 
Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Verona et al., 2001; Benning 
et al., 2003. 
Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Snyder et al, 1991; Scheier, 
Carver & Bridges, 1994; Irving et al., 
2004. 
Planning Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Hart and Dempster, 1997. 
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Relation to high optimism Variable Relation to Secondary 
Psychopathy 
Negative correlation 
 
Cites: Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 
1994; Lewis & Kliewer, 1995; 
Raikkonenet al., 1999; Campbell & 
Kwon, 2001; Kwon, 2002. 
Anxiety Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Harpur et al., 1989; Hare, 
1991; Patrick, 1994; Levenson, 
Kiehl & Fitzpatrick, 1995; 
Blackburn, 1998; Verona et al., 
2001. 
Negative correlation 
 
Cites: Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 
1994; Mascaro, Rosen & Morey, 2004. 
Neuroticism Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Harpur et al., 1989; Hare, 
1991; Widiger & Lynam, 1998; 
Lynam, Whiteside & Jones, 1999; 
Verona et al., 2001. 
Negative correlation 
 
Cites: Kashani et al., 1997; Lucas, 
Diener & Suh, 1996; Raikkonen et al., 
1999; Chang & Sanna, 2001. 
Negative Affect Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Patrick, 1994; Verona et al., 
2001; Benning et al., 2003; Patrick 
et al., 2003. 
Negative correlation 
 
Cites: Meadows & Kaslow, 2002; 
Kaslow et al., 2002. 
Suicide behavior Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Verona et al., 2003. 
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Negative correlation 
 
Cites: McCauley Ohannessian et al., 
1993; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 
1994; Carvajal, Clair, Nash & Evans, 
1998; Grunbaum et al., 2000; Carvajal, 
Evans, Nash & Getz, 2002; Willinger 
et al., 2002;  Brown et al., 2002; 
Bolland, 2003. 
Substance Abuse Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Smith & Newman, 1990; 
Hemphill, Hart & Hare, 1994; 
Reardon, Long & Patrick, 2002; 
Benning et al., 2003. 
Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Snyder et al, 1991; Scheier, 
Carver & Bridges, 1994; Irving et al., 
2004. 
Planning Negative correlation 
 
Cites: Lillienfeld & Andrews, 
1996; Hart and Dempster, 1997. 
Positive Correlation 
 
Cites: Mascaro, Rosen & Morey, 2004. 
Conscientiousness Negative correlation 
 
Cites: Widiger & Lynam, 1998; 
Lynam, Whiteside & Jones, 1999. 
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Demographic Questionnaire 
 
 
 
What is your birthday? __________________ (MM/DD/YY) 
 
Which best describes the racial/ethnic group you belong to?   (circle one below) 
 
Caucasian/White  African American/Black  Hispanic/Latino 
 
 
Marriage status (circle one):  Single          Married            Divorced             Separated 
 
 
What was the last grade in school that you completed?_____________________ 
 
 If you did not finish high school, do you have a GED?_________ 
 
 
Have you ever been convicted of a misdemeanor crime? 
 
If yes to above, how many times has this happened?______________ 
 
 
Have you ever been convicted of a felony crime? 
 
If yes to above, how many times has this happened?______________ 
 
 
Have you ever been sent to prison for a crime? 
 
If yes to above, how many times has this happened?______________ 
 
 
 
How many times have you been arrested?_________________ 
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Attitudes Questionnaire 
 
1.  The crime that I am in trouble for should not carry the degree of punishment that it 
does. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree 
 
2.  The court system made a fair and correct decision in my case. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree 
 
3.  The judicial system is biased against minorities and the poor. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree 
 
4.  In the future, people who commit crimes should not get the breaks I have had. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree 
 
5.  I think that most people in trouble with the law got themselves there. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree 
 
6.  Since I am not in jail/prison, I don't think I should have a probation officer watching 
me. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree 
 
7.  Most crime has something to do with drugs. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree 
  116
Appendix D: (Continued) 
 
8.  Since I am forced to be here, I should not have to pay for the services I receive. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree 
 
9.  People who commit crimes should not be able to avoid jail/prison time. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree 
 
10.  A person's childhood experiences have a lot of effect on their adult behaviors. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly 
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree 
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Writing Assignment 
 
Below are 3 paragraphs to choose from.  We would like you to give each one a quick 
read and then choose the 1 that you feel makes the best argument for its point.  
Then copy that 1 paragraph that you like the best onto the other blank piece of 
paper.  Please do not put your name on the paper that you write on and copy what is 
written exactly as it is on this paper. 
 
 
 
I think that too many people who get into trouble with the law are allowed to get off easy 
for too long.  Research has shown that many people who break the law had received light 
punishments for years before they were in big trouble. Many who have broken the law 
repeatedly said that they never changed because they had gotten off light many times 
before and they never felt they were going to get into any real trouble.  I think that if 
people would be punished early on with out getting off light, that they would learn their 
lesson earlier in life and not cause so much trouble later on.  I don’t think that the justice 
system should give breaks to those who break the law.     
 
 
 
I think that those who break the law should have to do their part to help pay part of the 
costs of their trial, jail time, probation etc.   Research shows that the prosecution and 
supervision of those who commit crimes costs this country more each year.  If money 
that was put into criminal justice was put into something else, then people who were in 
need could be helped.  I think that it just makes sense for those who commit a crime to be 
the ones who pay for the process to be played out and for all the post-incarceration costs 
such as probation too.  I think that if people did more to pay for the costs of their actions 
that maybe they would have a better sense of what they were costing society. 
 
 
 
I think that those who have committed crimes in the past should have law enforcement 
keeping an eye on them for a while in the future.  Research has shown that those who 
commit one crime are likely to commit another one in the future.  Many of those who 
have not been under the supervision of someone like a probation officer have felt free to 
commit crimes again.  I think that individuals like probation officers serve a real purpose 
in making sure that those who have gone wrong in the past will not be as likely to go 
wrong again in the future.  I think that society is better off when offenders on probation 
have someone watching over them until they are off probation. 
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Date: _________________         
SRPS 
 
Listed below are a number of statements.  Each represents a commonly held opinion and 
there are no right or wrong answers.  You will probably disagree with some items and 
agree with others.  Please read each statement carefully and circle the number which 
best describes the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement, or the 
extent to which each statement applies to you. 
      Disagree        Disagree          Agree          Agree 
Item      Strongly       Somewhat      Somewhat    Strongly 
1.  Success is based on survival of the 
fittest; I am not concerned about the 
losers. 
      1         2         3        4 
2. For me, what’s right is whatever I can 
get away with. 
 
      1 
 
        2 
 
        3 
  
        4 
3. In today’s world, I feel justified in doing 
anything I can get away with to succeed. 
      1         2         3         4 
4. My main purpose in life is getting as   
many goodies as I can. 
      1         2         3         4 
5. Making a lot of money is my most 
    important goal. 
      1         2         3         4 
6. I let others worry about higher values; 
my main concern is with the bottom line. 
      1         2         3         4 
7. People who are stupid enough to get         
ripped off usually deserve it. 
      1         2         3         4 
8. Looking out for myself is my top 
    priority. 
      1         2         3         4 
9. I tell other people what they want to 
hear so that they will do what I want 
them to do.  
      1         2         3         4 
10. I would be upset if my success came at 
someone else’s expense. 
      1         2         3         4 
11. I often admire a really clever scam.       1         2         3         4 
12. I make a point of trying not to hurt 
others in pursuit of my goals. 
 
      1 
  
        2 
  
        3 
 
        4 
13. I enjoy manipulating other people’s  
feelings.  
      1         2         3         4 
14. I feel bad if my words or actions cause 
someone else to feel emotional pain. 
      1         2         3         4 
15. Even if I were trying very hard to sell 
something, I wouldn’t lie about it.  
      1         2         3         4 
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      Disagree         Disagree          Agree         Agree 
Item       Strongly       Somewhat      Somewhat   Strongly 
16. Cheating is not justified because it is unfair 
to others. 
      1        2         3         4 
17. I find myself in the same kinds of 
trouble, time after time. 
      1         2         3         4 
18. I am often bored.       1         2         3         4 
19. I find that I am able to pursue one goal 
for a long time. 
      1         2         3         4 
20. I don’t plan anything very far in  
      advance. 
      1         2         3         4 
21. I quickly lose interest in tasks I start.       1         2         3         4 
22. Most of my problems are due to the 
fact that other people just don’t 
understand me. 
      1         2         3         4 
23. Before I do anything, I carefully 
consider the possible consequences. 
      1         2         3         4 
24. I have been in a lot of shouting 
matches with other people. 
      1         2         3         4 
25. When I get frustrated, I often "let off 
steam" by blowing my top. 
      1         2         3         4 
26. Love is overrated.       1         2         3         4 
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LOT-R 
Please be as honest and accurate as you can throughout.  Try not to let your response to 
one statement influence your responses to other statements.  There are no "correct" or 
"incorrect" answers.  Answer according to your own feelings, rather than how you think 
"most people" would answer.  To answer a question put the letter corresponding to the 
answer you wish to give on the line next to each question.  For example, if your answer 
to a question is “A” meaning “I agree a lot”, then put an “A” on the line to the right of 
that question, and so forth. 
 A = I agree a lot  
 B = I agree a little  
 C = I neither agree nor disagree  
 D = I DISagree a little  
 E = I DISagree a lot  
1.  In uncertain times, I usually expect the best. _________ 
2.  It's easy for me to relax.    _________ 
3.  If something can go wrong for me, it will.  _________ 
4.  I'm always optimistic about my future.   _________ 
5.  I enjoy my friends a lot.     _________ 
6.  It's important for me to keep busy.   _________ 
7.  I hardly ever expect things to go my way.  _________ 
8.  I don't get upset too easily.   _________ 
9.  I rarely count on good things happening to me.  _________ 
10.  Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.  _________ 
  121
Appendix H 
Attitudes Towards Situations Questionnaire 
 
These items are statements that you might use to describe your opinions and feelings 
regarding various situations.  For each item you should circle either T or F.  The meaning 
of these two possible answers is given below. 
 
T = Definitely or Probably true 
F = Definitely or Probably false 
 
 
So if the statement is definitely or probably true for you, then you should circle T.  If the 
statement is definitely or probably false for you, then you should circle F. 
 
Other items contain two statements marked A or B.  For these items you should circle 
either A or B for your answer.  The meaning of these two possible answers is given 
below. 
 
A = Definitely or Probably A 
 B = Definitely or Probably B 
 
(1) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Running a steam presser in a laundry for a week 
(B) Being caught in a blizzard 
 
(2) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Being in a bank when suddenly three masked men with guns come in and 
make everyone raise their hands 
(B) Sitting through a two-hour concert of bad music 
 
(3) It might be fun and exciting to experience an earthquake 
 
T 
F 
 
(4) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Attempting to beat a railroad train at a crossing 
(B) Spraining my ankle so that I can’t walk on it 
 
(5) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Standing in line for something 
(B) Getting an electric shock as part of a medical experiment 
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Appendix H: (Continued) 
 
(6) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Balancing along the top rail of a picket fence 
(B) Walking up four flights of stairs 
 
(7) I might enjoy riding in an open elevator to the top of a tall building under 
construction 
 
 T 
 F 
 
(8) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Walking a mile when it’s 15 degrees below zero 
(B) Being near when a volcano erupts 
 
(9) I would not enjoy fighting a forest fire 
 
 T 
 F 
 
(10) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Having to walk around all day on a blistered foot 
(B) Sleeping out on a camping trip in an area where there are rattlesnakes 
 
(11) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Having a pilot announce that the plane has engine trouble and that he may 
have to make an emergency landing 
(B) Working in the fields digging potatoes 
 
(12) It would be fun to explore an old abandoned house at night 
 
 T 
 F 
 
(13) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Being out on a sailboat during a great storm at sea 
(B) Having to stay home every night for two weeks with a sick relative 
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(14) I would enjoy trying to cross the ocean in a small but seaworthy sailboat 
 
 T 
 F 
 
(15) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Riding a long stretch of rapids in a canoe 
(B) Waiting for someone who’s late 
 
(16) It might be fun to walk a tightrope 
 
 T 
 F 
 
(17) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Being in a circus when two lions suddenly get loose in the ring 
(B) Bringing my whole family to the circus and then not being able to get in 
       because a clerk sold us tickets for the wrong night 
 
(18) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Having to drive alone for a day and a half without stopping for sleep because 
       I stayed on my vacation too long 
(B) Jumping from a third story window into a fireman’s net 
 
(19) I would not like to try skydiving 
 
 T 
 F 
 
(20) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Finding out my car was stolen when I don’t have theft insurance 
(B) Riding a runaway horse 
 
(21) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Being chosen as the “target” of a knife throwing act 
(B) Being sick to my stomach for 24 hours 
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(22) I like (or would like) to dive off a high board 
 
 T 
 F 
 
(23) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Tying up a truck full of newspapers for a paper sale 
(B) Seeing a tornado cloud moving toward me when I’m driving in the country 
 
(24) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Being in a flood 
(B) Carrying a ton of coal from the backyard into the basement 
 
(25) I would enjoy learning to handle poisonous snakes 
 
 T 
 F 
 
(26) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Realizing the ice is unsafe when I’m standing in the middle of a frozen lake 
(B) Finding that someone has slashed all four of my tires 
 
(27) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Being seasick every day for a week while on an ocean voyage 
(B) having to stand on the ledge of the 25th floor of a hotel because there’s a fire 
      in my room 
 
(28) Of the following two situations I would like the LEAST: 
 
(A) Burning my arm badly by leaning against a hot water pipe 
(B) Swimming where sharks have been reported 
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Written Assignment Questionnaire 
 
 
Please answer the question below by circling a number on the scale below. 
 
 
Earlier you were asked to write some sentences on a topic of your choosing.  How free 
did you feel to choose the topic that you wrote about? 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Not at all    Completely 
  free to      free to  
 choose    choose  
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BIS/BAS 
 
Each item of this questionnaire is a statement that a person may either agree with or 
disagree with.  For each item, indicate how much you agree or disagree with what the 
item says.  Please respond to all the items; do not leave any blank.  Choose only one 
response to each statement.  Please be as accurate and honest as you can be.  Respond to 
each item as if it were the only item.  That is, don't worry about being "consistent" in 
your responses. 
 
 
1.  If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty "worked up."  
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
2.  I worry about making mistakes. 
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
3.  Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit.  
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
4.  I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me. 
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
5.  Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or 
nervousness. 
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
6.  I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something. 
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
7.  I have very few fears compared to my friends.  
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
8.  When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized. 
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
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9.  When I'm doing well at something I love to keep at it. 
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
10.  When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly. 
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
11.  It would excite me to win a contest.  
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
12.  When I see an opportunity for something I like I get excited right away.  
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
13.  When I want something I usually go all-out to get it.  
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
14.  I go out of my way to get things I want. 
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
15.  If I see a chance to get something I want I move on it right away. 
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
16.  When I go after something I use a "no holds barred" approach.  
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
17.  I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun.  
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
18.  I crave excitement and new sensations.  
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
 
19.  I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun.  
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
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20.  I often act on the spur of the moment.  
 1 2 3 4  
Agree Strongly Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat  Disagree Strongly 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
About the Author 
 John “Chip” Weir graduated from the University of California at Davis with a 
bachelors degree in psychology in 1996.  In 1999, while studying social and health 
psychology, he received a Masters of Science from the University of Utah.  As a graduate 
student at USF, he developed an interest in conducting research on the construct of 
psychopathy.  He has co-authored an article on psychopathy measurement in youth which 
was published in Law and Human Behavior.  Further, he is also co-author on two 
manuscripts which have been submitted for publication on the topics of youth substance 
use, criminal involvement and intervention services.  Lastly, in 2006 he received a 
dissertation award from the American Academy of Forensic Psychology for the current 
study. 
 
